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BOWEN v. KENDRICK CHURCH AND STATE, AND
THE MORALITY OF TEENAGE SEX
INTRODUCTION
Congress passed the Adolescent Family Life Act (the "AFLA" or the
"Act") in 1981 to promote care services for pregnant adolescents, counsel
pregnant adolescents about the alternatives to abortions, and study the
problems associated with adolescent pregnancy.' The Act requires grantees
to describe the manner in which they will encourage community groups,
including religious organizations, to participate in their programs.2 This Note
1. 42 U.S.C. § 300z (1982 and Supp. Il 1985). Under section 300z l(a)(4)(G), services
that the AFLA promotes include:
(i) information about adoption;
(ii) education on the responsibilities of sexuality and parenting;
(iii) the development of material to support the role of parents as the provider of
sex education;
(iv) and assistance to schools, youth agencies, and health providers to educate
adolescents and preadolescent concerning sexual self-discipline and responsibility in
human sexuality ....
Id. Under section 300z-l(a)(4)(O), the AFLA provides "outreach services to families of ado-
lescents to discourage sexual relations among unemancipated minors." Id.
2. The AFLA describes the role of religious organizations within the Act in four sections.
First, the Act describes the idea that procreative issues "are best approached through a variety
of integrated and essential services provided to adolescents and their families by other family
members, religious and charitable organizations, voluntary associations, and other groups, in
the private sector as well as services provided by publicly sponsored initiatives." 42 U.S.C. §
300z(a)(8)(B) (1988) (emphasis added). Second, the Act provides as follows:
[S]ervices encouraged by the Federal Government should promote the involvement
of parents with their adolescent children, and should emphasize the provision of
support by other family members, religious and charitable organizations, voluntary
associations, and other groups in the private sector in order to help adolescents and
their families deal with complex issues of adolescent premarital sexual relations and
the consequences of such relations ....
42 U.S.C. § 300z(a)(10)(C) (1988) (emphasis added).
Third, the AFLA describes the role of demonstration projects: The Secretary may
make grants to further the purposes of this subchapter to eligible grant recipients
which have submitted an application which the Secretary finds meets the require-
ments of § 300z-5 of this title for demonstration projects which the Secretary
determines will help communities provide appropriate care and prevention services
in easily accessible locations .... Demonstration projects shall use such methods
as will strengthen the capacity of families to deal with the sexual behavior, preg-
nancy, or parenthood of adolescents and to make use of support systems such as
other family members, friends, religious and charitable organizations, and voluntary
associations.
42 U.S.C. § 300z-2 (1988) (emphasis added).
Finally, the requirements for application section of the AFLA, states that grant applicants
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will focus upon whether the participation of religiously affiliated groups in
the AFLA's counseling services is consistent with the establishment clause.'
Those who have studied issues concerning separation of church and state
have adopted two basic approaches in analyzing whether a statute that
provides funds to religiously affiliated groups, such as the AFLA, violates
the establishment clause. First, some have concluded that a statute is con-
stitutional unless it tends to advance a single national religion. 4 Others have
concluded that even if a statute does not advance a particular religion, it
violates the establishment clause if it promotes religion in general.' The
United State Supreme Court has adopted the latter view.6
In Bowen v. Kendrick,7 the United States Supreme Court decided whether
the AFLA unconstitutionally benefitted particular religions or religion in
general by funding religiously affiliated organizations that provided procre-
ative counseling. Kendrick argued that Bowen, the Secretary of Health and
Human Services, could not administer the AFLA in a secular manner because
of the significant risk that religiously affiliated groups would promote religion
while counseling teenagers about sex and pregnancy.' The Kendrick Court
held the AFLA constitutional on its face and remanded the case to the
district court to rule upon the statute as applied. 9
This Note will describe the background of the establishment clause and
the legislative history of the AFLA. Then, the procedural history of Kendrick
will be summarized. Next, this Note will examine why the Court should have
held the AFLA unconstitutional both on its face and as applied. Finally,
this Note will examine the impact of the Kendrick decision upon future
establishment clause cases, the AFLA, and similar programs.
"shall include" in their applications to the Secretary of Health and Human Services "a
description of how [they] will, as appropriate in the provision of services . .. involve religious
and charitable organizations, voluntary associations and other groups in the private sector as
well as services provided by publicly sponsored initiatives." 42 U.S.C. §§ 300z-5(a) and 300z-
5(a)(21) (1988) (emphasis added).
3. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion ... U.S. CONST.
amend I.
4. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 113 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Lynch v.
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678 (1984); 3 J. STORY, COMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES 728 (1833); McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 Sup. CT. REv. 1
(1986).
5. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947); Levy, The Original Meaning of the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, in RELIGION AND THE STATE 85 (. Wood, Jr.,
ed. 1985). See also Braveman, The Establishment Clause and the Course of Religious Neutrality,
45 MD. L. REv. 352, 386 (1986) (Court should maintain neutrality between religion and
nonreligion).
6. See, e.g., Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. I (1947).
7. 108 S. Ct. 2562 (1988).
8. See Appellees' and Cross-Appellants' Brief at 26, Bowen v. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. 2562
(No. 87-253).
9. 108 S. Ct. 2562 (1988).
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I. BACKGROUND
A. Early Establishment Clause Decisions
Modern interpretation of the establishment clause began with the United
States Supreme Court decision, Everson v. Board of Education.10 In Everson,
the Court considered the constitutionality of a New Jersey statute that
reimbursed parents for the costs of transporting their children to and from
parochial schools in public transportation buses." The Everson Court found
that spending even a small amount of taxes in support of religious institutions
violated the establishment clause.' 2 Nevertheless, the Court held that a state
may reimburse parents for the costs of transporting their children to and
from parochial schools in public transportation buses if the school district
also provided transportation to public school students. 3 The Court empha-
sized that a total ban on funding of religious institutions and of the people
10. 330 U.S. 1 (1947). The Everson Court looked to the writings of James Madison and
Thomas Jefferson to interpret the establishment clause. Id. at 11-12. Jefferson described the
establishment clause as "a wall of separation between church and state." Id. at 16 (quoting
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878)). Similarly, Madison stated that one should
never have to pay any taxes in support of any religion. Id. at 12. The Virginia legislature
expressed its support for Madison's and Jefferson's views when it passed the "Virginia Bill for
Religious Liberty," which provided as follows:
[Tihat to compel a man to furnish contributions of money for the propagation of
opinions which he disbelieves is sinful and tyrannical; that even the forcing him to
support this or that teacher of his own religious persuasion, is depriving him of the
comfortable liberty of giving his contributions to the particular pastor, whose morals
he would make his pattern.... That no man shall be compelled to frequent or
support any religious worship, place, or ministry whatsoever ....
Id. at 13 (quoting VnINIA BILL FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 12 Hening, Statutes of Virginia 84
(1823); K. COMMAGER, DOcUs1saNTS OF AmERicAN HISTORY 125 (1944)). Thus, the Everson Court
concluded that government may not promote religion. See id. at 13. For further explication of
Everson see Howard, The Supreme Court as Uncertain Stonemason, in RELIGION AND THE
STATE 85 (J. Wood, Jr. ed. 1985).
11. Everson, 330 U.S. at 3.
12. The Everson Court explained: "No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to
support any religious activities or institutions." Id. at 16. Everson interpreted the establishment
clause to mean that "Inleither a state nor the federal government may set up a church. Neither
can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another."
Id. at 15. Numerous scholars have agreed. E.g., Levy, supra note 5, at 85; see also Braveman,
supra note 5, at 386; contra Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 113 (1985) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) ("As its history abundantly shows, however, nothing in the Establishment Clause
requires government to be strictly neutral between religion and irreligion, nor does the Clause
prohibit Congress from pursuing legitimate secular ends through nondiscriminatory sectarian
means."); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678 (1984) ("The real object of the [First]
Amendment was ... to prevent any national ecclesiastical establishment, which should give to
an hierarchy the exclusive patronage of the national government.") (quoting 3 J. STORY,
COMNMNTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 728 (1833)) (brackets in original);
McConnell, supra note 4, at I ("[T]he state itself is religiously pluralistic-not secular").
13. Everson, 330 U.S. at 2-3, 26.
1322 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:1319
who participate in religious organizations would be antagonistic to religion,
instead of neutral. 4 The Court compared the statute to a social welfare
program that merely provided private school children the same opportunities
for safety that the state offered public school children. I"
The Court in Abington School District v. Schempp 6 applied the Everson
Court's requirement of neutrality toward religion in a two-part test to
determine whether a statute promotes religion, and thus, violates the estab-
lishment clause. 7 In Abington, the Court decided the constitutionality of a
Pennsylvania law which required public school teachers to read the Bible at
the beginning of each school day. Some children were excused from these
readings upon their parents' request." The Court used a two-prong test to
determine whether the statute had both a constitutional purpose and effect.
The Court concluded that the statute had both the purpose and primary
effect of establishing religion 9 and therefore held that the law was uncon-
stitutional.20
In a subsequent case, the Court did not use either the purpose or effects
test to evaluate an establishment clause claim. Rather, the Court, in Walz
v. Tax Commission, considered whether the statute caused excessive entan-
glement between religion and government. 2' The plaintiffs in Walz challenged
New York City's practice of exempting religious organizations from property
14. Id. at 16-18.
15. The government's reimbursement to parents for the costs of transporting their children
to parochial schools was held to be no more of an endorsement of religion "than services
[such] as ordinary police and fire protection, connections for sewage disposal, public highways
and sidewalks." Id. at 17-18. Although the Court allowed indirect aid to religion in Everson,
it warned that the separation between church and state "must be kept high and impregnable.
We could not approve the slightest breach." Id. at 18. A state may also lend the textbooks
used in public schools to parochial school students when there is no evidence that the textbooks
are being used in a sectarian manner because secular textbooks are not "instrumental in the
teaching of religion." Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 248 (1968). See Zorach v.
Clauson 343 U.S. 306, 313-15 (1952). In Zorach, the Court upheld New York City's released
time program, where public school students who received their parents' permission could leave
the school to attend religious instruction at religious centers. No governmental entity funded
any expenses of the instruction. The Court held that the program was constitutional because it
did not promote religious coercion, but merely accommodated religious people. Id.
16. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
17. Id. at 222 ("[T]o withstand the strictures of the Establishment Clause, there must be a
secular purpose and primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion.").
18. Abington, 374 U.S. at 205.
19. Id. at 222-25.
20. Id.; see Sky, The Establishment Clause, The Congress and the Schools: An Historical
Perspective, 52 VA. L. Rv. 1395, 1440 (1966) (Abington was consistent with Madison's view
that the establishment clause should serve as "a guarantee against such governmental support
of not only one but 'all' orthodoxies"). See also Johnson, Compliance and the Supreme Court
Decision-Making, 1967 Wis. L. REv. 170, 184-85. Local schools' interpretations of cases such
as Abington will vary significantly. Some schools within religious communities will adapt to
decision such as Abington by having prayers before lunch, instead of during classes. Id.
21. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
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taxes. 22 The Court reasoned that the exemption prevented the active entan-
glement between government and religion that would result if government
taxed the property of religious organizations. 23 Thus, the Court looked solely
at whether the statute resulted in excessive entanglement in determining the
constitutionality of statutes under the establishment clause, and held that
the exemption was constitutional. 24
The Walz decision, however, added more confusion than guidance for
courts evaluating establishment clause claims. 25 This is because Walz did not
cite Abington, or the purpose and effects tests, and therefore courts did not
know what test they should use.
B. Lemon v. Kurtzman
The Court did not base its establishment clause decisions on any single
enduring test until Lemon v. Kurtzman."6 In Lemon, the Court combined
the purpose, effect, and entanglement prongs into one test. 27 The Lemon
Court examined the constitutionality of two statutes: (1) a Rhode Island
statute which allowed the state to directly pay part of parochial school
teachers' salaries directly to the teachers; 2 and (2) a Pennsylvania statute
which authorized the state to reimburse parochial schools for teachers'
salaries .29
The Lemon Court asserted that a statute violates the establishment clause
if it violates any one of the following prongs: (1) the main legislative purpose
must be secular; (2) the main effect of the statute must not be to promote
or to hinder religion; and (3) the statute must not cause excessive entangle-
ment between church and state.30 The Lemon Court focused on the third
22. Id. at 666-67.
23. Id. at 674-78. According to the Court, the purpose of the law was to protect religious
institutions from governmental oppression, rather than to support religion. Id. at 673. The
Court reasoned that the exemption did not benefit religion per se because all nonprofit
organizations, including "hospitals, libraries, playgrounds, scientific, professional, historical,
and patriotic groups," were tax exempt, not just those with religious affiliations. Id. Further-
more, all fifty states have exempted religious organizations from property taxes. There were no
indications that America's long tradition of exempting religious organizations from paying
property taxes had contributed to the establishment of religion. Id. at 676-78. The Supreme
Court 1969 Term, 84 HAxv. L. REv. 30, 131 (1971) [hereinafter Supreme Court] (main flaw
of Walz is that the excessive entanglement test requires "case by case adjudication").
24. Walz, 397 U.S. at 668, 674-75.
25. Cf. Howard, supra note 10, at 96 (proliferation of tests has left little clarity) (citing
Everson, 330 U.S. 1 (1947)).
26. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
27. Id. at 611-15; Howard, supra note 10, at 91-92.
28. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 607-08.
29. Id. at 609-10.
30. Id. at 612-13. Some, such as Justice Harlan in Walz, contend that political divisiveness
is a fourth and independent element of statutes which violate the establishment clause. Walz,
397 U.S. 665, 674 (1968). Justice Rehnquist disagrees. Howard, supra note 10, at 98 (citing
Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 394-95, n.11 (1983)). The Lemon Court, however, did not
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prong, excessive entanglement." In order to determine whether the statutes
caused excessive entanglement, the Court looked at the nature of: (1) the
institutions funded; (2) the aid given to the institutions; and (3) the rela-
tionship between the church and state in the government administration of
the statutes. 32
First, the Court determined that the nature of the parochial schools was
to promote religion and that religious officials influenced teachers' conduct.
3
Accordingly, the Court found that the schools were so intertwined with
religion that there would be a significant risk that funding the schools would
result in the promotion of religion.34
Examining the second aspect of excessive entanglement, the type of aid
given, the Court evaluated whether government's direct payments to teachers
at parochial schools promoted religion. 3' The statutes that the Lemon Court
invalidated, while providing funds for teachers in religious schools, prohibited
governmentally funded teachers from teaching religion courses or using
religious materials.3 6 The district court found that the funded courses could
hypothetically be taught in a secular manner. 37 Nevertheless, the Court
reasoned that teachers at parochial schools often dedicate their lives to
religion, and it would be unreasonable to expect them to separate their
religious beliefs from their teaching. 3 The Court stated that if the statutes
consider political divisiveness to be an independent prong, but instead analyzed political
divisiveness under the excessive entanglement prong. 403 U.S. 602, 623 (1971). Accord Kendrick
v. Bowen, 657 F. Supp. 1547, 1569 (D.D.C. 1987) ("political divisiveness has never been the
only ground for holding a statute unconstitutional").
31. Id. at 613-25. Although the Court held that the purpose of the statutes in question in
Lemon had the clear secular purpose of improving the quality of secular education, it held that
the statutes violated the third prong of the Lemon test, the excessive entanglement prong. Id.
at 613-14. Because a statute is unconstitutional if it violates one of the three prongs, and the
statutes in Lemon violated the excessive entanglement prong, the Court did not find it necessary
to determine whether the statutes violated the effects prong (the second prong). Id.
32. Id. at 617-24.
33. Id. at 615, 620. The Court found that the Rhode Island statute contributed to the risk
that government would advance religion because of a number of factors. Id. at 615, 617-18.
First, religious officials could conveniently exercise religion within the schools because some of
the schools in Lemon were near the parish churches. Id. at 615. Second, the schools placed
religious symbols throughout the premises. Id. at 615. Third, nuns were often instructors and
principals. Id. at 615, 617. Fourth, parish priests determined which teachers taught at the
schools and influenced teachers' salary levels. Id. at 617. Fifth, instructors' handbooks advocated
the teaching of religion in all classes. Id. at 618.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 608, 610.
37. Id. at 618 ("I[T]he District Court found that religious values did not necessarily affect
the content of the secular instruction," yet the Court concluded that there was "potential if
not actual hazards of this form of state aid").
38. Id. at 618-19. "[Tjhe State may send a cleric, indeed even a clerical order, to perform
a wholly secular task." Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 746 (1976). However,
there is a great risk that members of religious organizations will not separate their secular
1324 [Vol. 39:1319
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were upheld, it could not be certain that state-subsidized teachers would not
promote religion. 39 Thus, the Court concluded that a state which directly
funded teachers at parochial schools created an unconstitutional risk that
such funding would promote religion.40
Third, the Court examined whether the New Jersey and Pennsylvania
statutes contributed to entanglement between church and state because of
the statutory nature of the relationship between religious organizations and
government.4 ' The statutes required grantees to apply for annual funding. 42
The Court predicted that each time one of the grantees requested to renew
its grants, a split along religious lines would result with those religious groups
which had few members in parochial schools bitterly resenting governmental
funding of those religious groups which benefit most from aid to parochial
schools.4 3 The Court sought to avoid such a risk because potential "political
division along religious lines was one of the principal evils against which the
beliefs from their religious beliefs in others tasks. "There is a very real and important difference
between running a soup kitchen or a hospital, and counseling pregnant teenagers on how to
make the difficult decisions facing them." Bowen v. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. at 2591 (Blackmun,
J., dissenting).
39. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 619. ("The State must be certain, given the Religion Clauses, that
subsidized teachers do not inculcate religion.") (emphasis added); Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S.
402, 415 (1985) (Powell, J., concurring); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 369, 372 (1975).
40. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 607, 609, 616, 621. The Pennsylvania statute had "the further
defect of providing state financial aid directly to the church-related school," id. at 621, as
opposed to giving the funds to the parents of the students in the form of subsidies. See Everson
v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 26 (1947) (Court allowed state reimbursement to parents for
transporting their children to parochial school). The Lemon Court quoted Walz to explain the
dangers of government directly funding religious organizations:
Obviously a direct money subsidy would be a relationship pregnant with involvement
and, as with most governmental grant programs, could encompass sustained and
detailed administrative relationships for enforcement of statutory or administrative
standards ....
Lemon, 403 U.S. at 621 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 675 (1970)).
It would be quite cumbersome to prevent the statutes in Lemon from having effects that
advance religion. "The conflict of functions inheres in the situation .... Id. at 617. The
Court continued as follows:
A comprehensive, discriminating, and continuing state surveillance will inevitably
be required .... Unlike a book, a teacher cannot be inspected once so as to
determine the extent and intent of his or her personal beliefs and subjective
acceptance of the limitations imposed by the First Amendment. These prophylactic
contacts will involve excessive and enduring entanglement between state and church.
Id. at 619.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 623.
43. Id. at 622-23. In Rhode Island, "nonpublic elementary schools accommodated approx-
imately 25% of the State's pupils. About 95% of these pupils attended schools affiliated with
the Roman Catholic Church." Id. at 608. Similarly, in Pennsylvania, most of the private
schools were affiliated with the Catholic Church. Id. at 610.
The resentment would probably increase over time as the government programs expanded,
as most government programs do. "[M]odern governmental programs have self-perpetuating
and self-expanding propensities." Id. at 624.
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first amendment was intended to protect." 44 Furthermore, in contrast to
Walz, the benefit to parochial school in Lemon was innovative and risky
because the tax exemption for religious property had existed for 200 years
without creating an establishment of religion. 45 Thus, the Court held that
the statutes created an unconstitutional entanglement between government
and religion.46
On the same day that the Court decided Lemon, the Court held in Tilton
v. Richardson47 that the funding of construction grants for colleges and
universities imposed the same danger of entanglement of government and
religion as the direct funding of teachers' salaries at parochial elementary
and secondary schools.4 The disputed statute in Tilton, the Higher Education
Facilities Act ("HEFA"), authorized construction grants for college and
university buildings used exclusively for secular education. 49 The grantees
included religiously affiliated institutions. In Tilton, as in Lemon, the Court
focused on the excessive entanglement prong and examined the nature of:
(1) the institutions funded; (2) the aid; and (3) the relationship between
government and religion under the statute.50
44. Id. at 622 (citing Freund, Public Aid to Parochial Schools, 82 HAuv. L. REv. 1680,
1692 (1969)). Accord Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 372 (1975). In Meek, the Court invalidated
a Pennsylvania law providing funding for support staff, as well as loans to nonpublic schools
for secular instructional materials and equipment, holding that the funding would create "a
serious potential for divisive conflict over the issue of aid to religion." Id.
45. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 624.
46. Id. Since Lemon, the Court has continued to be reluctant to directly fund parochial
elementary and secondary schools because such funding could be used in a sectarian manner.
E.g., School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985). The Ball Court ruled upon
the validity of a statute which provided funds for full-time public school teachers to teach some
secular courses in the parochial schools. The Court held that the funding constituted a direct
aid to schools that were almost all pervasively sectarian (forty of forty-one) and had an effect
of promoting religion. Id. at 375-76, 385. In Aguilar v. Felton, the Court held that New York
City could not use federal funds to pay the salaries of public school teachers to teach in
parochial schools. The schools were pervasively sectarian, so it would require excessive entan-
glement of church and state in order to prevent a sectarian use of the federal funds. 473 U.S.
402, 404, 412 (1985). In Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, the Court
ruled that a direct subsidy of $30 to $40 dollars per student per year for maintenance and
repair of facilities of the schools violated the establishment clause. The challenged New York
statute required that all schools spend funds available through the statute on secular purposes.
See 413 U.S. 756, 762-63 (1973).
The Court has only upheld direct aid to pervasively religious institutions when there are rigid
controls to insure that grantees do not use funds in a pervasively sectarian manner. E.g.,
Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980). For example, in Regan the Court
upheld a New York statute reimbursing parochial elementary and secondary schools for the
costs of administering and grading secular tests prepared by the state. Id. The Court allowed
New York to reimburse private schools because the state audited the grantees to be sure that
the funds that were reimbursed to schools did not exceed costs. Id. at 659-60.
47. 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
48. Id. at 674-77.
49. Id. at 675-76.
50. The Court held that the statute had the secular purpose of improving the education of
college students. Id. at 678-79.
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First, the Court reasoned that the nature of the typical college or university
is substantially different from the nature of the typical private primary or
secondary school.5 Colleges and universities, unlike parochial schools, gen-
erally have primary purposes and effects that are secular.5 2 Consequently,
the Court reasoned that funding to religious colleges or universities would
require less governmental monitoring. 3 Furthermore, college and university
students are often less impressionable and less accepting of proselytism than
parochial elementary and secondary school age students . 4 The Court sug-
gested that religiously affiliated colleges and universities generally encourage
academic freedom and critical analysis among student and faculty more than
parochial elementary and secondary schools." Additionally, the record in
Tilton supported the Court's conclusion that the grantees were actually using
their funds in a religiously neutral atmosphere.16 Thus, the Supreme Court
found that colleges and universities were not likely to be pervasively sec-
tarian.
7
The second primary difference between the statutes in Lemon and the
construction grants in Tilton involved the nature of the governmental aid
required." The aid in Lemon directly subsidized teachers who, themselves,
51. Id. at 684-86.
52. Id. at 686.
53. Id. at 687; Cf. Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 412 (1985); Meek v. Pittenger, 421
U.S. 349, 371 (1975); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 615 (1971).
54. Tilton, 403 U.S. at 686 ("There is substance to the contention that college students are
less impressionable and less susceptible to religious indoctrination.") (footnote omitted).
55. Id. at 686 ("Many church related colleges and universities are characterized by a high
degree of academic freedom and seek to evoke free and critical responses from their students.")
(footnote omitted).
56. The Court stated:
[Aippellants' position depends on the validity of the proposition that religion so
permeates the secular education provided by church-related colleges and universities
that their religious and secular educational functions are in fact inseparable ...
This record . . . provides no basis for any such assumption here.
Id. at 680-81.
The institutions presented evidence that there had been no religious services or
worship in the federally financed facilities, that there are no religious symbols or
plaques on them, and that they had been used solely for nonreligious purposes. On
this record, therefore, these buildings are indistinguishable from a typical state
university facility.
Id. at 680. In contrast, in Lemon "[t]he school buildings contain identifying religious symbols
such as crosses on the exterior and crucifixes, and religious paintings either in the classrooms
or hallways." Lemon, 403 U.S. at 615.
Although most of the religiously affiliated colleges and universities were affiliated with
Catholicism and most of the students were Catholic, the schools admitted non-Catholics as
students, and the administration hired non-Catholics as faculty members. According to the
Court, the fact that the schools in Tilton did not proselytize would reduce the risk of promoting
religion. Tilton, 403 U.S. at 686-87.
57. Id. at 680.
58. Id. at 687-88.
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had strong religious beliefs that might affect their teaching,5 9 whereas the
aid in Tilton funded religiously neutral buildings. 60 The Court concluded
that it was easier to monitor buildings than to monitor the contents of
teachers' instructions, 6' and thus did not find the nature of the HEFA
funding inherently religious.6 2
Third, the Tilton Court concluded that the construction grants did not
create a strong enough relationship between church and state to require
much governmental monitoring to prevent the promotion of religion."3 The
fact that the construction grants were one-time grants diminished the degree
of entanglement between church and state. 64 Because colleges and universities
generally do not proselytize, government would not need to thoroughly
inspect the use of the governmentally funded buildings at colleges and
universities. 65 Thus, the Court concluded that the relationship between gov-
ernment and religion would not create excessive entanglement."
The Tilton Court discussed important factors to ascertain the extent to
which it would be willing to endure the risks of establishment clause viola-
tions. The Court concluded that the possibility that the religiously affiliated
organizations might use funds in a pervasively sectarian manner would not
invalidate the statute when there was no evidence that the grantees who were
receiving funding at the time of the Court's decision were using governmental
funds to promote religion.6 7
Even though the Tilton Court held that the primary aspects of HEFA
were constitutional, it did hold that a part of the HEFA was unconstitu-
59. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 607.
60. Tilton, 403 U.S. at 687-88.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 688.
64. Id.
65. Id. The one-time construction grants provided in the HEFA would not require inspection
of grantees' financial records, but would merely require occasional examination of the premises
to determine whether the building was being used for religious purposes. Id. In contrast, the
grants in Lemon required annual renewal, so political struggles over funding might occur
annually along religious lines. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 623.
66. Tilton, 403 U.S. at 688.
67. Id. at 681, 686. At first glance, the Court's willingness to endure some unconstitutional
effects might seem to conflict with Lemon, where the Court was unwilling to endure any
possibility that secular school teachers would teach sectarian doctrine with state funds. "The
State must be certain, given the Religion Clauses, that subsidized teachers do not inculcate
religion. ... Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. at 619 (emphasis added). For example, the Tilton
Court stated:
A possibility always exists, of course, that the legitimate objectives of any law or
legislative program may be subverted by conscious design or lax enforcement. There
is nothing new in this argument. But judicial concern about these possibilities
cannot, standing alone, warrant striking down a statute as unconstitutional.
Tilton, 403 U.S. at 679. However, the holdings of Tilton and Lemon were significantly different
because Tilton, unlike Lemon, concluded that there was no evidence that the grantees receiving
funding had used funds in a secular manner or were likely to use funds in a sectarian manner.
Id. at 681, 686.
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tional .6 HEFA prohibited any grantee from using a funded building for any
sectarian use for twenty years after the construction of the building. 69 After
twenty years had passed, an institution could use the governmentally funded
facilities as it pleased. 70 The Court concluded that the twenty-year provision
would enable a grantee to use government funds for sectarian purposes, and
thus might unconstitutionally advance religion. 7'
C. Supreme Court Decisions Since Lemon
After the Tilton Court concluded that the grantees under the Act could
successfully separate their religious and secular activities, the Court in Roe-
mer v. Board of Public Works 2 narrowed the range of institutions that it
considered ineligible for funding under the establishment clause. 71 In Roemer,
the Court examined the constitutionality of a Maryland statute which pro-
vided grants for secular use to colleges and universities, which included
religiously affiliated colleges. 74 Concluding that the institutions' primary
purpose was secular teaching, the Court upheld the district court's finding
that the institutions were not pervasively sectarian." The Court also found
that the district court's rulings were reasonable in light of the fact that most
68. Id. at 683.
69. Id. at 682-83. Grantees who violated the HEFA's provisions had to disgorge any funds
they received. Id.
70. Tilton, 403 U.S. at 683.
71. Id. at 684. Nevertheless, the Court upheld the bulk of the statute because the uncon-
stitutionality of a part of a statute does not invalidate the other provisions of the statute unless
it is clear that the legislature would have been unwilling to pass only the constitutionally valid
parts of the statute. Id. at 683-84 ("The cardinal principal of statutory construction is to save
and not to destroy.") (quoting NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 30 (1937)).
"The unconstitutionality of a part of an Act does not necessarily defeat . . . the validity of its
remaining provisions. Unless it is evident that the legislature would not have enacted those
provisions which are within its power, independently of that which is not, the invalid part may
be dropped if what is left is fully operative as a law." Id. at 684 (quoting Champlin Roofing
Co. v. Commission, 386 U.S. 210, 234 (1932)); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 770 (1981).
See United States v. Salerno, 107 S. Ct. 2095, 2100 (1987). Thus, when the Lemon Court found
the Rhode Island and Pennsylvania statutes totally invalid, it implicitly found that Rhode Island
would not have passed a bill aiding only non-sectarian private elementary and secondary schools.
See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. at 616.
72. 426 U.S. 736 (1976).
73. Id. At the time of Roemer, the Court considered an institution pervasively sectarian if
"religion is so pervasive [within the institution] that a substantial portion of its functions are
subsumed in the religious mission." Tilton, 403 U.S. at 752 (quoting Hunt v. McNair, 413
U.S. 734, 743 (1973)).
74. Roemer, 426 U.S. at 739-40. Colleges and universities which provide mainly religiously
oriented degrees were not eligible for funds. Id. at 741-42. The state board of public works
administered the grants. Id.
75. Id. at 755-59. The schools' hiring and admissions policies were indicative of their
purpose. Hiring and selection of students were not based upon religion, except to the extent
that people from religious orders were often hired to reduce expenses. Id. at 756-57..
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of the grantees under the statute had no religious affiliation.7 6 Moreover,
the state board had forbidden some sectarian uses of funds, such as funding
religion classes and construction grants for buildings used for religious
activities.7 7 Although some of the educational institutions had voluntary
Catholic services, mandatory religion classes, and prayers at the beginning
of some classes, the Court determined that the colleges were not pervasively
sectarian and upheld the statute providing funding .
7
In the years since Lemon, the Court has expressed its reluctance to find
that a statutory purpose violates the establishment clause when it has a
plausible secular purpose.79 Nevertheless, since Lemon, the Court has held
that a number of statutes have unconstitutional purposes.80 For example, in
Stone v. Graham,81 the Court decided the constitutionality of a Kentucky
law which required public schools to post the Ten Commandments in each
classroom.8 2 The Court concluded that the avowed purposes of the law were
insincere and that its sole purpose was an unconstitutional attempt to advance
religion. 3
Although the Court has invalidated various laws which violate the purpose
prong of the Lemon test, the Court has rarely held that a statute violates
the second or third prongs of the Lemon test unless the statute provides
direct funds to parochial schools.84 The Court has continued to follow
Everson v. Board of Education by allowing indirect subsidies to parochial
schools which parents for the costs of parochial school expenses if those
benefits are granted in a facially neutral statute.8 ' In other words, the statute
76. Compare id. at 765 with Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist,
413 U.S. 756 (1973) (Court found statute providing direct subsidy to schools, ninety-five percent
of which had Roman Catholic affiliations, unconstitutional).
77. Roemer, 426 U.S. at 760 n.22 (Board's restrictions upon funding religious classes and
construction of buildings where religion was taught reflected Board's intention to enforce
statute's restriction upon sectarian use).
78. Id. at 755-56.
79. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 394-95 (1983). See also Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S.
578 (1987) (stating reluctance to hold statute's purpose invalid, but ruling that the stated purpose
was insincere); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 66 (1985) (stating reluctance to find a statute's
purpose unconstitutional, but concluding that record did not identify secular purpose) (Powell,
J., concurring).
80. In Edwards v. Aguillard, the Court ruled that a Louisiana law which allowed evolution
to be taught only if creationism was also taught was unconstitutional because it served no
legitimate secular purpose. 482 U.S. at 586-89. The Court ruled that an Alabama statute
allowing a period for prayer or meditation had no secular purpose. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472
U.S. at 40-42, 59-60 (1985). See also Jaffree v. Board of School Comm'rs, 459 U.S. 1314,
1315-16 (1983) (holding that an Alabama law "permitting public school teachers to lead their
classes in prayer" was unconstitutional) (Powell, J. concurring).
81. 449 U.S. 39 (1980).
82. The copies of the Ten Commandments were purchased with private contributions. Id.
at 42.
83. Id. at 42-43.
84. See, e.g., Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
85. Id.
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must provide the benefits to those who go to public schools, as well as
private schools, even if few public school students are eligible for the
benefit.8 6 Thus, a statute which provided tuition reimbursements only for
the parents of nonpublic school students was found unconstitutional in
Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist. 7 Yet, the
Court held that a statute which allows tuition reimbursements to all parents
who paid tuition, constitutional in Mueller v. Allen. s8 Although the Mueller
Court admitted that the economic effect of reimbursing parents for their
children's private school expenses is identical to the effects of directly
subsidizing the private schools,89 the Court held that only direct subsidies of
parochial schools are unconstitutional. 90
In Marsh v. Chambers,9 the Court temporarily abandoned the Lemon
test and further narrowed the scope of practices it considered pervasively
sectarian.92 In Marsh, the Court examined whether Nebraska's practice of
beginning each meeting of the legislature with a prayer led by a chaplain
who drew a salary from governmental funds violated the establishment
clause. 93 The Court compared the Nebraska legislature to the United States
Congress which had employed a chaplain for nearly two centuries. 94 As in
Walz v. Tax Commission,9 the Court chose not to invalidate a tradition
that had not caused any blatant establishment of religion. 9
The Court reduced the scope of what constitutes pervasively sectarian
activity even further when it decided in Lynch v. Donnelly,97 that government
employees may place creches on public property. 98 Applying the Lemon test,
the Court reasoned that any resulting endorsement of Christianity resulting
86. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 764 (1973).
87. 413 U.S. 756 (1973). Where eighty-five percent of the nonpublic school elementary and
secondary school students in New York went to sectarian schools, the Court found that it
violated the establishment clause to reimburse parents of the students for part of the tuition
costs. Id. at 764, 768. "[I]nsofar as such benefits render assistance to parents who send their
children to sectarian schools, their purpose and inevitable effect are to aid and advance those
religious institutions." Id. at 793.
88. 463 U.S. 388 (1983). In Mueller, ninety-five percent of the nonpublic elementary and
secondary students attended sectarian schools. The Court held it constitutional for the childrens'
parents to deduct some of their tuition and transportation expenses from their income taxes.
Id. at 398.
89. Id. at 399.
90. Id. The Court did not explain why indirect subsidies create less danger of an establish-
ment of religion. See also Note, Mueller v. Allen: A New Standard of Scrutiny Applied to Tax
Deductions for Educational Expenses, 1984 DUKE L.J. 983 (indirect subsidies to parochial
schools create little risk of establishment of religion).
91. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
92. Id. at 793.
93. Id. at 786.
94. Id. at 787-789.
95. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
96. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 793-95.
97. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
98. Id. at 671.
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from a creche on public property would be, at most, minimal.9 The Lynch
Court reasoned that the placing of a creche on public property was no more
of an endorsement of Christianity than placing a piece of art with Christian
symbols in a publicly funded art museum'0° and, therefore, constitutional.' 0'
Although the scope of activities that the Court considers pervasively
sectarian has narrowed since the Lemon decision, the Court continues to use
the Lemon test. The Court has, however, restricted its standards of what
constitutes an establishment clause violation with respect to the effects and
entanglement prongs of Lemon. 02 Despite the Court's reluctance to invalidate
a statute with a plausibly secular purpose, it has invalidated some statutes
which have sectarian purposes or allow direct funds to parochial schools.
II. THE AFLA AND Ti BoWEN v. KENDRICK DECISION
A. Statutory Background of the AFLA
The stated purpose of the AFLA 03 is to provide services and research in
order to prevent teenage sex and pregnancy.1' 4 The statute does not provide
federal funding for any abortion clinics or abortions, but funded programs
may refer a pregnant adolescent to an abortion counseling service if the
adolescent and her parents request a referral. 05
Disputes over the AFLA's possible establishment clause violations arose
because it requires potential grantees to describe how they will involve
religious organizations within their respective communities.?° The Senate
Committee on Labor and Human Resources Report on the AFLA stated
that religion was not one of the factors for determining which groups receive
99. Id. at 683. The creche cost about $20 a year to set up and to dismantle. Id. at 671;
Contra Braveman, supra note 5, at 385-86 ("[Tlhe Court [in Lynch] willingly embraced a sacred
religious symbol of a specific denomination.").
100. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 683. Contra Redlich, Nativity Scene Insults Jews, N.Y. Times, Mar.
26, 1984, at A19, col. 2.
101. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687.
102. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
103. 42 U.S.C. § 300z (1988).
104. See supra notes 1-2; Bowen v. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. 2562, 2566 (quoting S. REP. No.
161, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1981)). "[T]he AFLA is essentially a scheme for providing grants
to public or nonprofit private organizations or agencies 'for services and research in the area
of premarital adolescent sexual relations and pregnancy,"' and "the elimination or reduction
of social and economic problems caused by teenage sexuality, pregnancy and parenthood," Id.
at 2566-71. In other words, "encouraging sexual restraint among young people." Id. at 2582
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
105. "[Pirograms or projects which do not provide abortions or abortion counseling or
referral, [or] ... advocate, promote or encourage abortion." Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. at 2567-68
n.3 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 300z-10(a)).
106. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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funding under the AFLA. 07 Nevertheless, the AFLA wording specifies that
grant applicants "shall include" in their applications to the Secretary of
Health and Human Services a description of the manner in which they will
include religious and other community groups in their programs. 08
B. Facts and Procedure of Bowen v. Kendrick
The plaintiffs in Bowen v. Kendrick,'09 a group of "federal taxpayers,
clergymen, and the American Jewish Congress,""' 0 alleged that the AFLA
violated the establishment clause both on its face and as applied."' Kendrick
challenged two parts of the AFLA: (1) the portion that required all applicants
for AFLA funding to describe the manner in which they plan to involve
religious groups within their respective communities in their programs;" 2 and
(2) the part which forbids funding to groups which advocate abortion, or
provide abortions or abortion counseling." 3
Kendrick alleged a number of reasons for his conclusion that the funding
of a number of grantees had violated the establishment clause." 4 First,
107. S. REP. No. 161, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., at 16 (1981) ("Religious affiliation is not a
criterion for selection as a grantee under the adolescent family life program, but any such
grants made by the Secretary would be a simple recognition that nonprofit religious organizations
have a role to play in the provision of services to adolescents.").
108. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300z-5(a), 300z-5(a)(21) (1982 & Supp. III 1985); The Senate Report
described the Act as "promoting the involvement of religious organizations" and that religious
groups should be included in the program because of their positive moral influence. See S.
REP. No. 161, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., at 15-16 (1981) ("Recognizing the limitations of Government
in dealing with a problem that has complex moral and social dimension, the committee believes
that promoting the involvement of religious organizations in the in the solution to these problems
is neither inappropriate or illegal.").
109. 108 S. Ct. 2562 (1988).
110. Id. at 2568. Although there were multiple plaintiffs to both the district court decision
and the Supreme Court decision, this Note will hereinafter refer to Chan Kendrick as the
plaintiff.
111. Id. at 2568. See also id. at 2579 ("[F]ederal taxpayers have standing to raise Establish-
ment Clause claims against exercises of congressional power under the taxing and spending
power of Art. I, § 8, of the Constitution."). The defendants did not dispute that Kendrick had
standing to challenge the AFLA on its face, but challenged Kendrick's standing to challenge
the AFLA as applied. The Court held that Kendrick had standing.
112. Kendrick v. Bowen, 657 F. Supp. 1547, 1553 (D.D.C. 1987).
113. Id. ("The plaintiffs contend that these two sections, when read together, not only permit
religious organizations to use government funds to provide counseling-type services, but restrict
AFLA funding of religious organizations to those that oppose abortion.").
114. Bowen v. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. 2562, 2568 (1988). The majority in Kendrick stated that
the government provided $10.7 million in AFLA grants, religiously affiliated grantees received
$3.3 million, and that the grantees that the district court cited for establishment clause violations
received $1.3 million. Id. at 2575 n.12. The thirteen grantees which the district court cited
received over $10 million of the $53.5 million which the government allocated to the AFLA.
Id. at 2585 n.3 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Another 13 religiously affiliated organizations received
$6 million of the $53.5 million. Id. Furthermore, "a third of the approximately 100,000 'clients
served' by all AFLA grantees during the 1985-86 period received their services from 'cited'
grantees, and nearly 11,000 more from the other 'religiously affiliated' institutions." Id.
The district court concluded that at least ten grantees which received funding between 1982
and 1986 violated the establishment clause. 657 F. Supp. at 1565 (footnote omitted).
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Kendrick provided examples of grantees or subgrantees who directly taught
religious doctrine in their AFLA programs, or had strong ties with a partic-
ular faith that required the groups to follow religious doctrine.", One grantee
expressly ordered an employee to teach religious doctrine to the AFLA
participants.'1 6 Second, Kendrick alleged that three of the grantees described
their purposes for existence in sectarian terms to the Secretary." '7 Third,
subgrantees did not teach birth control and based their curriculum on
religious materials."' Fourth, members of religious orders served instructors
for the AFLA grantees." 9 Fifth, a number of the grantees had sectarian
services which immediately followed the AFLA programs, so that the AFLA
clients could not distinguish who sponsored the programs. 20 Finally, many
programs took place on sites adorned with religious symbols.' 2'
Kendrick alleged that the Secretary of Health and Human Services had
denied some of the grantees funding because they did not teach religion,
and even notified the grantees that they were ineligible to receive funding
because they were secular.'22 No Jewish organizations received funding. 23
In contrast to Kendrick's allegations, the government claimed that the
Secretary warned grantees not to use funds in a sectarian manner and stated
that he had ceased funding one group which continued using funds in a
sectarian manner.'24 Furthermore, he implied that grantees would have to
disgorge funds that they used in a manner which violated the establishment
clause.' 25 However, he conceded that at least three grantees had used the
AFLA funds in a sectarian manner.' 26
115. Id. at 1563 (footnote omitted).
116. Id. at 1564-65. The grantee, St. Margaret's Hospital was "a self-described 'Christian
institution' committed to acting 'in harmony with the teaching of the Catholic Church."' Id.
at 1564 (citation omitted).
117. Id. at 1565. Lutheran Family Services described in its articles of incorporation that one
of its purposes of existence is "ft]o promote the extension of the kingdom of God through
compassionate Christian love [and] ... [t]o promote. . . the teaching of the Lutheran Church."
Id. Additionally, Family of the Americas Foundation, an affiliate of WOOMB-International,
stated in its "Aims and Objectives" that it was "inspired by the Encyclical Human Vitae, the
papal encyclical setting forth Catholic dogma on birth control and abortion." Id. (citation
omitted).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1566.
121. Id.
122. Appellees' and Cross-Appellees' Brief at 8-9, Bowen v. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. 2562 (1988)
(No. 87-253). Rejected applicants were told that they had not received funding because their
programs promised "no involvement of religious groups." Id. at 8 n.16.
123. Brief of the Anti-Defamation League of B'Nai B'rith on Behalf of Itself and Americans
for Religious Liberty as Amici Curiae, in Support of Appellees at 7, Bowen v. Kendrick, 108
S. Ct. 2562 (1988) (No. 87-253).
124. Brief for the Appellant at 41, Bowen v. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. 2562 (1988) (No. 87-253).
125. Id.
126. Id.
1334 [Vol. 39:1319
BOWEN v. KENDRICK
1. The District Court Decision
Using the Lemon test, the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia examined the constitutional validity of the AFLA, both on its
face and as applied. The district court concluded that the AFLA had a
constitutional purpose, but that both on its face and as applied, the AFLA
had the effect of promoting religion 27 and would require excessive entan-
glement between church and state. 28
a. The test to determine the AFLA's validity on its face
The district court applied the first prong of the Lemon test to determine
whether the AFLA had a secular purpose. 29 The court disagreed with
plaintiffs' claim that one of the statute's purposes, aiding religious groups,
was unconstitutional. 30 The court stated that a statutory purpose was un-
constitutional under the establishment clause only if the sole purpose was to
aid religion.' 3 ' Because one of the statutory purposes of the AFLA was
clearly to prevent teenage pregnancy, the court found the AFLA had a
constitutional purpose.
13 2
The district court then examined whether the AFLA, on its face, had the
primary effect of promoting religion, and thus violated the second prong of
the Lemon test. The district court found troubling a number of aspects of
the statute. First, the language of the AFLA and its legislative history show
that religious groups were intended beneficiaries of grants.'33 Second, the
AFLA's emphasis upon counseling promotes religion because the AFLA
funds counseling in areas closely linked to religious issues: sexual relations
and procreative issues.' 34 Third, the AFLA's terms do not restrict the teaching
of religion.' Fourth, the AFLA also had the effect of encouraging particular
religious views. 3 6 The AFLA's prohibition against funding groups that ad-
vocate or perform abortion promoted the views of religions that consider
abortion immoral.'3 7 Fifth, it would be unreasonable to expect the grantees
127. Kendrick v. Bowen, 657 F. Supp. 1546, 1560-62, 1564-67 (D.D.C. 1987).
128. Id. at 1568.
129. Id. at 1558-59.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. ("[Tihe statute's purpose was to solve the problems caused by teenage pregnancy
and premarital sexual relations. This is a valid secular purpose.") (footnote omitted).
133. Id. at 1561. The court stated that "AFLA money cannot impermissibly subsidize 'the
primary religious mission' of the institutions that receive public funds." Id. (citations omitted).
134. Id. at 1562-63.
135. Id. See Note, Kendrick v. Bowen: "Primary Effect" Analysis and the Adolescent Family
Life Act, 1988 B.Y.U. L. REv. 115, 139 ("[T]he AFLA does not satisfy the 'primary effect'
prong of the Lemon test because it fails to provide adequate safeguards against the advancement
of religion.").
136. Religious organizations often teach against premarital sexual relations and abortion.
Kendrick, 657 F. Supp. at 1563.
137. Id.
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from religious organizations to put their sectarian views aside in matters that
are inherently religious."' Sixth, the teaching of religion by AFLA employees
would create a symbolic link between church and state that would be
especially strong because pregnant adolescents seeking advice are impres-
sionable. 39 The court expressed a concern that adolescents would begin to
associate government and religion and consider the link between them nor-
mal.'14 Seventh, even if it were possible for government to maintain secular
counseling among religious organizations, the enforcement of such neutrality
would violate the free exercise clause.' 4' Thus, the district court held that
the effects of the statute were unconstitutional. 1
42
The district court analyzed the same three factors that the Lemon and
Tilton Courts examined to determine if the AFLA, on its face, caused
excessive entanglement between church and state: (1) the nature of the
institutions receiving funds; (2) the types of programs that the aid funds;
and (3) the relationship between church and state as government administers
the aid.' 43 The district court examined the first aspect of excessive entangle-
ment, and concluded that the AFLA both as applied and on its face'"
required the grantees to be sectarian.' 45 The district court held that the AFLA
was invalid because extensive monitoring, and thus excessive entanglement
between church and state, would be necessary to diminish the potential for
sectarian use of the funds. 46
Second, the court feared that the nature of the aid, created a substantial
danger that grantees would interject religious principles into their counsel-
ing.' 47 The court found that religious counselors would often mix secular
and religious thought. The nature of their work made the separation diffi-
cult.' 14 The court found the facts in Kendrick similar to those in Lemon,
138. Id.
139. Id. at 1562-63.
140. The court explained its concern that "the involvement of religious organizations in
counseling and education on premarital sex, abstinence, and the preferability of adoption to
abortion creates a 'crucial symbolic link' between government and religion when the counseling
is funded by the public." Id. at 1563-64.
141. Id. at 1563.
142. Id. at 1564.
143. Id. at 1567.
144. The court explained that "[t]he definition of 'religious organizations' so clearly means
organizations with a religious character and purpose that 'one would necessarily need to consult
a lawyer to effectively misconstrue it."' Id. at 1567 (quoting Logan v. United States, 518 F.2d
143, 152 (6th Cir. 1975)).
145. Id. (referring to 42 U.S.C. § 300z-5(a)(21)(B) (1988)).
146. The court expressed the view that "[b]ecause these organizations have a religious
character and purpose, the risk that AFLA funds will be used to transmit religious doctrine
can be overcome only by government monitoring so continuous that it rise to the level of
excessive entanglement." Id. (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 615-16 (1971)).
147. Id.
148. Id. The court found that "because counseling is often done one-on-one, it is even more
susceptible than teaching to the intentional or inadvertent advancement of religion." Id. at
1568.
1336 [Vol. 39:1319
1990] BOWEN v. KENDRICK 1337
because both cases involved instructors who could not easily be monitored
and who taught young people, who are susceptible to indoctrination.
14 9
The district court also found the third factor, the nature of the relationship
between government and religion, troubling. To maintain the secular purpose
of the AFLA required entanglement between church and state. The court
found this entanglement unconstitutionally excessive.1 50
b. The AFLA as applied
Although the district court reasoned that there were sufficient grounds to
invalidate some of the provisions of the AFLA on its face, it also examined
whether the AFLA advanced religion as applied. The district court observed
that thirteen of the AFLA grantees or subgrantees had directly taught
religious doctrine in their AFLA programs or had required conformity to
sectarian doctrine'5 ' and ordered employees who were often members of
religious orders to proselytize religious doctrine to AFLA participants. IS
2
Finally, the fact that many programs took place on sites with religious
symbols influenced the court's decision.'53 Because of the strong religious
practices by many grantees and subgrantees, the district court held that the
AFLA had been applied in an unconstitutional manner and ordered the
Secretary of Health and Human Services not to allow religiously affiliated
groups to participate in the AFLA programs.
54
2. Supreme Court Opinion
The United States Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction of three
appeals from the district court and consolidated the cases for argument.'55
Like the district court, the Supreme Court examined both whether the AFLA
was constitutional on its face and as applied. 5 6 The majority concluded that
149. Id.
150. Id. at 1568.
151. Id. at 1565.
152. Id. at 1564-65.
153. Id. at 1566.
154. Id. at 1569.
155. On August 10, 1987, the Court stayed the district court order enjoining enforcement of
part of the AFLA because of "[tlhe presumption of constitutionality which attaches to every
Act of Congress." 108 S. Ct. 1 (1987). The Court consolidated the cases on November 9, 1987,
108 S. Ct. 326 (1987), and granted additional motions on January 25, 1988. 108 S. Ct. 771
(1988). The Supreme Court noted jurisdiction on three appeals: (1) an appeal of the August
13, 1987 order stating that the provisions of the AFLA allowing religious groups to participate
were severable from the other sections of the statute; (2) a cross-appeal by the appellees on the
same issue; and (3) Bowen's appeal of the district court's denial of a "motion to clarify what
the court meant by 'religious organizations' for purposes of determining the scope of its
injunction." 108 S. Ct. 2562, 2569 (1988).
156. The Court's analysis was somewhat unusual for establishment clause cases to the extent
that unlike most courts deciding establishment clause cases, it explicitly separated its arguments
concerning the statute on its face from its arguments on whether the statute was unconstitutional
as applied. See id. at 2569.
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the AFLA was facially constitutional, and remanded the case to the district
court to determine the constitutionality of the AFLA as applied.'
a. The majority opinion
1. The AFLA's facial validity.-The Court started its analysis of the
facial constitutionality of the AFLA, with the premise that a statute's purpose
is consistent with the establishment clause unless it is completely sectarian. 5 '
The Court easily rejected Kendrick's claims that the statute had an uncon-
stitutional purpose when it found that Congress clearly intended to help
prevent teenage pregnancy when it passed the AFLA, and not to promote
religion.'5 9 After concluding that the AFLA had a valid purpose, the Court
examined whether the AFLA, on its face, had the effect of advancing religion
by making religion a criterion for funding. The Court began by noticing
that the AFLA did not limit funding to religious organizations. '6 Although
the AFLA permits religious groups to receive funds, the Court found the
AFLA merely neutral toward religion because, by its terms, it does not
prohibit religious groups from participating.' 6' The Court concluded that
merely allowing religious groups to participate in AFLA would have, at
most, a de minimus effect of promoting religion. 62
Independent of the argument that the AFLA advanced religion by making
religion a criterion for funding, the Court examined whether the AFLA
promoted religion merely by directly funding religious groups for providing
advice on preventing teenage pregnancy. The Court determined that because
a number of community groups could participate in the AFLA programs,
the statute was neutral toward religious groups. 63 Comparing the AFLA's
funding of religiously affiliated organizations to subsidizing colleges and
universities, the Court concluded that religiously affiliated AFLA grantees,
157. Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion was joined by Justices White, O'Connor, Scalia
and Kennedy. Id. at 2565.
158. "[A] court may invalidate a statute only if it motivated wholly by an impermissible
purpose .... . Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. at 2570 (citing Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 680
(1984); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41 (1980)).
159. Id. (citing Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 586 (1987)).
160. Id. at 2572-73.
161. Id. at 2573 (citing Grand Rapids School District v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 382 (1985)).
AFLA also encourages the participation of "charitable organizations, voluntary associations
and other groups in the private sector." 42 U.S.C. § 300z-5(a)(21)(B) (1988) (footnote omitted).
162. The Court explained that "[alid normally may be thought to have a primary effect of
advancing religion when it flows to an institution in which religion is so pervasive that a
substantial portion of its functions are subsumed in the religious mission." Kendrick, 108 S.
Ct. at 2574-75 (quoting Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 743 (1973)). See Grand Rapids School
District v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 385 (1985) (by aiding religiously affiliated schools, state might
impermissibly aid religion). The Kendrick Court concluded that the AFLA program was unlike
the statutory program in Meek v. Pittenger, where the Court "struck down program that
entail[ed] an unacceptable risk that government funding would be used to 'advance the religious
mission."' Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. at 2575 (quoting Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 370 (1975)).
163. Id. at 2575.
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like religiously affiliated colleges and universities, are not inherently relig-
ious.' Additionally, the Court did not find the effects of the AFLA un-
constitutional merely because some of its provisions allow counseling on
subjects where the principles of the AFLA overlap with religious doctrine. 65
Moreover, the Court has traditionally upheld governmental funding of re-
ligious organizations which serve the public through social welfare func-
tions.'16 Therefore, the Court found that the AFLA's provisions funding
religiously affiliated organizations did not inherently have the effect of
promoting religion. 67
The Court responded to the argument that the AFLA had facially invalid
effects by concluding that AFLA does not expressly forbid pervasively
sectarian grantees from receiving federal funds. 68 Although the Court ad-
mitted that statutes which expressly forbid sectarian uses of governmental
funds are more clearly constitutional than those that do not expressly forbid
use by religious organizations, the Court found that a statute need not
explicitly forbid grantees from using statutory funds in a unconstitutional
manner in order to be constitutional. 6 9 The AFLA, according to the Court,
does not include religion among the criteria considered for funding. 70 To
the contrary, the Court found that the AFLA's terms provide protection
against sectarian use of funds in that they explicitly state that grantees must
describe in detail how they propose to use AFLA funds 7' and require the
government to evaluate the services that grantees provide. 72 Thus, the Court
held that the absence of an express provision against sectarian use of AFLA
funds did not make the AFLA unconstitutional on its face. 73
Finally, the Court applied the third prong of the Lemon test to the AFLA
and examined whether the statute, on its face, caused excessive entanglement
164. Id. at 2573-74.1
165. The Court explained as follows:
On an issue as sensitive and important as teenage sexuality, it is not surprising that
the government's secular interests would either coincide or conflict with those
religious institutions ... [but] [t]he facially neutral projects authorized by the
AFLA including pregnancy testing, adoption counseling and referral services, pre-
natal and postnatal care . . . are not themselves 'specifically religious activities.'
Id. at 2576.
166. Id. at 2574 (citing Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899) (upholding funds for the
construction of building on property of religiously affiliated hospital that served people of all
religions).
167. Id. at 2574-77.
168. Id. at 2577.
169. Id. (citing Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 740-41, 760 (1976). See also
Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 683 (1971) (upholding statute limiting construction grants
to religiously affiliated universities, but invalidating part of statute limiting secular restriction
on funds to twenty years).
170. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. at 2577.
171. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 300z-5(a) (1982 & Supp. III 1985)).
172. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 300z-5(b)(1)).
173. Id.
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between government and religion.7 4 The Court criticized the third prong as
posing a "Catch-22" because the very monitoring that prevents an estab-
lishment clause violation through the promotion of religion brings about a
constitutional violation through excessive entanglement.' 7 Nevertheless, the
Court did analyze the case in terms of the degree of entanglement that the
AFLA would cause. The Court concluded that because the AFLA differed
from statutes which provided funding for pervasively sectarian organizations,
the AFLA grantees would not require continuous monitoring. 76 Because the
limited monitoring, such as examining the AFLA educational materials and
occasional visits to the premises of AFLA grantees, would not constitute
excessive entanglement, the Court held that the AFLA, on its face, did not
require excessive entanglement between church and state.' 77
2. The AFLA 's validity as applied.-The Court next examined whether
the AFLA was constitutional as applied. The majority concluded that the
record lacked sufficient information to show which grantees were pervasively
sectarian or which factors the district court considered when it concluded
that particular grantees were pervasively sectarian. 7 The Court recognized
that the groups the district court cited for using governmental funds in a
sectarian manner did not receive a substantial amount of funds.179
The Court remanded the case with instructions that the district court
should not consider grantees to be pervasively sectarian merely because they
are religiously affiliated or motivated, or because their secular views overlap
with religious doctrine.'80 Instead, the court instructed that the district court
should determine whether any grantees applied AFLA funds toward religious
activities or counseling, and whether any grantees are pervasively sectarian.' 8
The Court held that if any grantees use funds to proselytize, the district
court should devise a remedy to prevent these grantees from violating the
establishment clause.'82
174. Id. at 2577-78. The Court recognized criticism of the third prong of the Lemon test.
Id. at 2578.
175. Id. at 2577-78.
176. Id. at 2578. The Court contrasted the AFLA with the statute in Aguilar v. Felton, 473
U.S. 402 (1985), in which the Court held that the statute directly aided pervasively religious
elementary and secondary parochial schools. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. at 2570 (citing Aguilar, 473
U.S. at 412-13). The federal statute in Aguilar funded public school teachers to go into parochial
schools to provide remedial education and guidance services for children from low-income
families. Id. at 2578 (citing Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 404-07).
177. Id. at 2578.
178. Id. at 2580.
179. The Court emphasized the fact that "only $1.3 million" of the $10.7 million in funding
went to the projects that the district court cited for constitutional violations. Id. at 2575 n.12.
180. Id. at 2580-81.
181. Id.
182. Id. The Court also held that if the Secretary of Health and Human Services allows
pervasively sectarian organizations to receive grants, the district court should apply a remedy
that is consistent with the establishment clause. Id. at 2581-82.
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b. Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion
In his concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy, who was joined by Justice
Scalia, expressed his view that the district court should not have considered
whether the grantees were religious.'83 According to Justice Kennedy, even
if a grantee was pervasively sectarian, it was entitled to funding unless it
used the AFLA funds to support its religious activities.8 4
c. The dissent
Before applying the Lemon test, the dissent analyzed the majority's as-
sumption that funding under AFLA is analogous to funding colleges and
universities.' 85 The dissent found proselytism a primary goal of many of the
AFLA grantees, and therefore, the facts of Kendrick more analogous to the
cases where the Court invalidated direct aid to elementary and secondary
parochial schools. 8 6 The dissent asserted that a primary goal of both the
AFLA grantees and parochial schools was the advancement of religion.' 87
The dissent also objected to the majority's failure to look beyond whether
AFLA grantees have an unconstitutionally high potential to violate the
establishment clause.' 88
Unlike the majority, the dissent did not separately examine the AFLA's
constitutionality, on its face and as applied, but instead, combined the two
types of statutory analysis as it applied the Lemon test. 8 9 The dissent first
analyzed whether AFLA violated the first prong of the Lemon test, the
purpose prong. Although Justice Blackmun found that the legislative intent
behind the provisions in the AFLA allowing religious groups to participate
was to help alleviate the problems of teenage pregnancy through religious
indoctrination,190 he found that the AFLA had a secular purpose.' 9' Accord-
ing to the dissent, even if Congress's funding religiously affiliated groups
did not create an inherent danger of sectarian use of governmental funds,
183. Id. at 2582. Justice O'Connor also wrote a concurring opinion in which she stated that
Kendrick might succeed upon remand because the record was clear enough to indicate that
some of the activities of the grantees were unconstitutional, and that the district court's
conclusions as to the extensiveness of these unconstitutional actions should determine the extent
of the remedy. Id. at 2581-82.
184. Id. at 2582.
185. Id. at 2583-85 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun's dissent was joined by
Justices Stevens, Brennan, and Marshall. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 2586. (The dissent stated that the AFLA grantees had proselytism as a high
priority, unlike religiously affiliated colleges and universities).
188. Id. at 2588.
189. Id. at 2583-84.
190. Id. at 2591 ("There is also, of course, a fundamental difference between government's
employing religion because of its unique appeal to a higher authority ... and government's
enlisting the aid of religiously committed individuals without regard to their sectarian motiva-
tion.").
191. Id. at 2587.
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the record demonstrated that AFLA grantees had actually violated the
establishment clause. 12
The dissent concluded that the AFLA violated the second prong of the
Lemon test, the effects prong, for a number of reasons. First, the dissenting
Justices objected to AFLA funding of teaching materials for sectarian or-
ganizations.19 a The dissent found that funding the teaching materials would
risk aiding religion to the extent that government would directly fund ma-
terials which it had not examined to determine whether they have sectarian
content. 94 Although the Court had upheld statutes indirectly funding per-
vasively sectarian activities, 95 it used a much higher standard of scrutiny
when determining whether direct funding of religiously affiliated organiza-
tions created the danger of establishment of religion. 9' Under this stricter
scrutiny, the dissent would only approve programs that fund written materials
printed by religiously affiliated organizations after careful examination to
ensure that the materials were not sectarian in content. 97 Because the Sec-
retary of Health and Human Services failed to screen the AFLA materials
for sectarian content, the dissent determined that the Secretary was admin-
istering the AFLA in an unconstitutional manner. 99
Second, the dissent objected to grantees' trying to influence susceptible
adolescents on matters closely interrelated to religious principles while on
the grantees' property which often had religious symbols. 99 The dissent
agreed with the district court that one would be naive to assume that
religiously affiliated organizations in a religious setting would refrain from
interjecting religion into subject matters that are fundamental to religious
doctrine.2" Although religious organizations may perform clearly secular
tasks with governmental funds, the risk that AFLA grantees would use funds
in a sectarian manner was too great to be constitutionally permissible,
especially when instructors teach young, impressionable people. 20 ' Third, the
dissent objected to the absence of language or other controls in the AFLA
forbidding the use of funds for religious purposes. 20 2 The dissent cited cases
192. For example, the dissent stated that one grantee taught that "[tlhe Church has always
taught that the marriage act, or intercourse, seals the union of husband and wife .... Another
grantee instructed to parents and adolescents, "[yjou want to know the church teachings on
sexuality .... You are the church. You people sitting here are the body of Christ." Id. at 2583
(quotations in original) (citations omitted).
193. Id.
194. Id. at 2588.
195. Id. at 2587 (citing Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968)).
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 2588.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 2590.
201. Id. at 2589-90. "There is a very real and important difference between running a soup
kitchen or a hospital, and counseling pregnant teenagers on how to make the difficult decisions
facing them." Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. at 2591 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
202. Id. at 2593-94.
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in which the Court invalidated statutes which did not provide restrictions
upon sectarian use or which were upheld when the statutes did contain
restrictions. 23 Moreover, there are no administrative regulations forbidding
sectarian use of AFLA funds, such as the procedure in Tilton, where grantees
who used funds in a sectarian manner had to refund to the government any
grants they had received.3 The only means the Secretary had taken to
prevent religious use of AFLA funds was to send a notice to grantees. 20 5
Although the dissent would not invalidate a statute simply because its terms
caused a remote possibility of a sectarian use of governmental funds, the
dissent would not ignore the AFLA's substantial potential and actual viol-
ations of the establishment clause. 206 The groups that the district court cited
for establishment clause violations received a substantial percentage of the
AFLA funds.2°7 Furthermore, the cited groups served one-third of the clients
who participated in the AFLA programs. 208
After concluding that the AFLA had the effect of promoting religion,
Justice Blackmun concluded that the AFLA violates the third prong of the
Lemon test, excessive entanglement, for two reasons. First, the dissent
summarily dismissed the argument that AFLA would cause a "Catch-22." 2°9
Second, the dissent repeated its contention that religiously affiliated organ-
izations are analogous to parochial schools and, if funded, would require
continuous monitoring. 210 This monitoring would cause excessive entangle-
ment between church and state. 211
The dissent next determined that excessive entanglement would take place
based upon the same three factors the Court considered in Lemon and
Tilton, the nature of: (1) the funded institutions; (2) the aid; and (3) the
203. Id. at 2593-94. The Court quoted:
Nothing in the statute, for instance, bars a qualifying school from paying out of
state funds the salaries of employees who maintain the salaries of employees who
maintain the school chapel, or the cost of renovating classrooms in which religion
is taught, or the cost of heating and lighting those same facilities. Absent appropriate
restrictions on expenditures for these and similar purposes, it simply cannot be
denied that this section has a primary effect that advances religion in that it
subsidizes directly the religious activities of sectarian elementary and secondary
schools.
Id. (quoting Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 774
(1973)); See also Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 760 (1976) (statute at issue
restricted use of public funds for "sectarian purposes"); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 744
(1973) (statute prohibited use of funds for buildings or other facilities used for sectarian
purposes).
204. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. at 2594.
205. Id. at 2594.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 2585 n.3.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 2595-96.
211. Id.
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relationship between church and state. 12 The dissent concluded that many
of the grantees were pervasively sectarian, that the activities the grantees
conducted were pervasively sectarian, and that disputes would arise between
grantees and government as to whether the AFLA's grantees participated in
religious activities. 213 According to the dissent, the record demonstrated that
the AFLA, on its face and as applied, promoted religion and caused excessive
entanglement between government and religion. 21 4
III. ANA.ysis
A. AFLA's Facial Unconstitutionality
1. AFLA 's Purpose
The Court unduly limited its analysis of the purpose of the AFLA.
Although the Court correctly found that one purpose of the AFLA, pre-
venting teenage pregnancy, was valid under traditional Lemon analysis, the
Court should have extended its analysis to review other purposes of the
statute. 2s Traditional Lemon analysis does not take into account some of
the establishment clause problems that statutes such as the AFLA may cause.
The Court's limited review of a statute's purpose under the purpose prong
of the Lemon test could lead to absurd results. Few would doubt that if
Congress passed a law to form a theocracy, its purpose would be inconsistent
with the establishment clause. However, under the Kendrick Court's analysis,
Congress would not have violated the purpose prong of the Lemon test if
the statute's purposes included the objective of gaining power and establish-
ing order within society. 2 6 If promoting religion was not the statute's sole
purpose, the Court would hold the purpose constitutional. 21 7
212. Id. at 2596.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 2596-97. Although the dissent did not divide its analysis into the statutory validity
on its face and as applied, its overall conclusion was that the AFLA was invalid both on its
face and as applied.
215. Id. at 2570-71. Perhaps, the reason the Supreme Court simply looked to see whether
one of the purposes of a statute was constitutional was that all laws could have religious
motivations. R. HOOKER, OF THE LAWS OF ECCLESIASTICAL POLITY [1594], Bk. 1, The Folger
Library Edition of the Works of Richard Hooker 142 (1977). "Of lawe there can be no lesse
acknowledged, than that her seat is the bosome of God, her voyce the harmony of the world,
all thinges in heaven and earth doe her homage, the very least as feeling her care, and the
greatest as not exempted from her power." Id. For example, simply because many of the
legislators who write laws against murder are partially motivated by religious considerations
would not make a law against murder inconsistent with the establishment clause. Harris v.
McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 319 (1980). "That the Judeo-Christian religions oppose stealing does not
mean that a State or the Federal Government may not, consistent with the Establishment
Clause, enact laws prohibiting larceny." Id.
216. See Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. at 2571.
217. See id.
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In order to avoid such absurd results, the Kendrick Court should have
looked beyond the AFLA's primary secular purpose and evaluated whether
the few provisions that arguably require religion have a constitutional pur-
pose.
The Court should have looked at the wording of the AFLA and the
legislative history to determine the actual purpose of the statute. Admittedly,
it is difficult to determine whether the purpose of the AFLA is to promote
religion, because the statutory language and the legislative history are am-
biguous and perhaps contradictory. 21
As a rule, courts should presume that a statute which neither explicitly
allows nor disallows religion as a criterion for funding to be constitutional
on its face.21 9 Courts should not hold a statute unconstitutional merely
because it fails to explicitly prohibit unconstitutional application. 220 The
Court correctly reversed the district court's holding that the AFLA was
unconstitutional solely because it does not forbid sectarian use of funds. 221
The district court's decision placed emphasis upon whether the statute's
wording explicitly prohibited unconstitutional application, which had been
of relatively minor importance in previous establishment clause cases. 222 The
fact that Congress failed to explicitly restrict the use of AFLA funds to
constitutional uses does not in itself create significant danger of governmental
advancement of religion. 22a The mere potential that a statute, if improperly
administered, will promote an establishment of religion should not invalidate
the statute. 2 4 Thus, as the Court concluded, the Court should not substitute
its judgment for the judgment of the legislature merely because the AFLA
does not explicitly exclude pervasively sectarian groups from funding eligi-
bility. 225
The wording of the AFLA, however, extends beyond not prohibiting
funding to some groups to specifically providing funding to religious organ-
izations. The plain wording of the AFLA suggests that the statute is not
constitutional. 226 The majority misinterpreted the requirement that grant
applicants "shall describe" the manner in which they will include religious
218. See supra notes 106-08 and accompanying text.
219. See Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. at 2577. As in Tilton, where the Court upheld the major
provisions of a statute, courts should presume statutes are constitutional. See supra note 68
and accompanying text.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 2577.
222. Id. Although the district court and dissent correctly cited cases have that have invalidated
statutes which did not expressly forbid sectarian use of governmental funds, these cases were
also invalid based upon other grounds, such as the fact that some of the statutes directly funded
parochial schools.
223. Id.
224. Even if part of a statute is unconstitutional, courts should uphold the constitutional
portions unless the legislature would not have passed the bill with only the valid sections.
225. See Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. at 2577.
226. Id. at 2572.
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groups within their respective communities to mean that they must describe
the manner in which they will include religious groups, if any, within their
programs. 227 Instead, the word "shall" suggests that the government must
include religious groups. Thus, as the district court stated, the AFLA's
provisions requiring religious participation have the purpose of promoting
religion. 22s Thus, the Court should have held that the AFLA violates the
purpose prong of the Lemon test.
In addition to the wording of the statute, the legislative history of the
AFLA implies that Congress intended to favor funding to religious groups.
Although one could argue that the legislative history does not appear to
promote religion, this interpretation seems more persuasive than the legis-
lative history indicating that religious groups are not favored under the
statute.2 29 The language in the Senate Committee Report on Labor and
Human Resources which indicates that religion is a criterion for funding
under the AFLA is sufficiently persuasive to outweigh the presumption of
constitutionality of the statute. On the one hand, the Senate Report explicitly
provided that religion should not be among the criteria used in selecting
grantees under AFLA. 230 The wording of the Senate Report suggests that
religious groups should be included in the AFLA in order to resolve the
moral and social problems of teenage pregnancy, and should thus be treated
on an equal basis with secular groups.2 1' On the other hand, the language
of the Senate Report stated that religiously affiliated groups should be
"promoted, 23 2 which is hardly a neutral word. The Senate Committee's
goal of "promoting" the participation of religious groups because of their
ability to solve "a problem that has complex moral and social dimensions
." is irreconcilable with the Committee's contention that religion is not
a criterion. 233 Such a policy, because it favors religiously affiliated groups
227. Id. at 2573.
228. Kendrick v. Bowen, 657 F. Supp. 1547, 1567 (D.D.C. 1987) (Courts should not search
for hidden meanings of statutes if "one would necessarily need a lawyer to misconstrue it.")
(quoting Logan v. United States, 518 F.2d 143, 152 (6th Cir. 1975)). See Rubin v. United
States, 449 U.S. 424 (1981) (if Court finds "terms of a statute unambiguous, judicial inquiry
is complete"); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 756 (1975) (Powell, J.,
concurring) ("The starting point in every case involving construction of a statute is the language
itself."); Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 266 n.9 (1981) (although courts should examine the
legislative history, "the words used, even in their literal sense, are the primary, and ordinarily
the most reliable, source of interpreting the meaning of any writing: be it a statute, a contract,
or any thing else") (quoting Cabell v. Markham, 148 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir. 1945), aff'd, 326
U.S. 404 (1945)).
229. See supra notes 103-08 and accompanying text.
230. S. REP. No. 161, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1981).
231. Id. See Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. at 2572.
232. S. REP. No. 161, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. 15-16 (1981).
233. Id.; see Appellee's Brief at 7, Bowen v. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. 2562 (1988) (No. 87-253)
("Fulfilling The AFLA's Purpose, HHS Injected Religious Bias Into The Grant-Making Process.").
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and discourages the participation of secular groups, is inconsistent with
establishment clause principles. 23 4
The authors of the Senate Report and the majority in Kendrick mistakenly
assumed that it is the government's job to determine whether adolescents
are exposed to religion. 235 The authors of the Senate Report seemed to
assume that the amount of religion in an institution can be easily quantified
when they stated that a certain amount of religion would be helpful to
prevent adolescent pregnancy. 236 The Kendrick Court accepted the Senate
Report's rationale behind the purpose of the AFLA. 37 The majority of the
Kendrick Court implied that if an institution is sectarian, but has the potential
to reduce teenage pregnancy, the legislature may constitutionally promote
this moderate amount of religion. 23
The majority in Kendrick should have concluded that the establishment
clause forbids all legislation respecting an establishment of religion, not
merely endorsement of religious orthodoxy. 23 9 Although interpreting the
establishment clause requires careful analysis, 240 a court's responsibility is to
determine whether government supports proselytism at all, not whether
government is promoting proselytism to an impermissible degree. 24 '
The Court in Tilton invalidated the part of the statute which allowed
colleges and universities to use federally funded buildings in a sectarian
234. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. at 2591 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The Court in Abington School
District v. Schempp found a Pennsylvania statute that required bible reading and recitation of
the Lord's Prayer in the public schools unconstitutional. The Court did not find the argument
that bible reading had secular purposes like promoting moral values and teaching literature
convincing. Abington, 374 U.S. 203, 223-24 (1963). "The Schempp Court rejected moral benefits
and moral stabilization as secular justifications for state aid to religion. If moral stabilization
is a valid secular purpose, then all sorts of aid to religion can be justified as secular in purpose,
at least so long as non-religious agencies are also subsidized for their morally stabilizing effects."
Supreme Court, supra note 23, at 129.
235. See S. REP. No. 161, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1981); Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. at 2590
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("It. should be undeniable by now that religion may not be employed
by government even to accomplish laudable secular purposes such as 'the promotion of moral
values, the contradiction to the materialistic trends of our times, the perpetuation of our
institutions and the teaching of literature."') (quoting Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374
U.S. 203, 223 (1963)).
236. See S. REP. No. 161, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 15-16 (1981).
237. See Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. at 2571 ("There simply is no evidence that Congress' 'actual
purpose' in passing the AFLA was one of 'endorsing religion').
238. Id.
239. Lemon v. Fitzgerald, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971). The Lemon Court stated that it must
be certain that teachers do not teach religion. See supra note 40.
240. See Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 766 (1976) ("There is no exact
science in gauging the entanglement of church and state.").
241. When the Lemon Court stated that it must be certain that public school teachers do
not teach religion, it implied that the teaching of any religion was impermissible. Id. See also
Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963) (state may not promote traditional
religion or a "religion of secularism"). "Obviously a direct money subsidy [to religion] would
be a relationship pregnant with involvement [between government and religion]." Walz v. Tax
Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 675 (1970).
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manner after twenty years, while maintaining the main provisions of the
statute.242 Similarly, if some sections of the AFLA have the purpose of
promoting religion, those sections should be held unconstitutional.2 43 The
Court invalidated a part of a statute in Tilton because that section violated
the establishment clause, 2" yet in Kendrick, the Court decided it should not
invalidate a part of a statute with a sectarian purpose unless the statute's
sole purpose is sectarian. 241
2. The AFLA 's Effect
While the Kendrick Court correctly concluded that the AFLA, on its face,
may not necessarily be applied in a manner that promotes religion, the Court
restated the effects prong of the Lemon test in a manner inconsistent with
the wording of the Lemon test, and thus provided precedent for courts to
find a statute which promotes religion constitutional.2"
Using the Lemon test, the Kendrick Court correctly concluded that the
AFLA does not promote religion merely because some of the principles of
religiously affiliated groups overlap with Congress's rationale behind creating
the AFLA. 247 Although the AFLA might advance the principles of some
religious groups because it forbids funding to groups that advocate abortion
or abortion counseling, this does not impermissibly advance religion. 24
However, the reason that the Supreme Court in Kendrick reached the
erroneous conclusion that the AFLA, on its face, does not promote the
establishment of religion is that the Court distorted the second prong of the
Lemon test.2 49 The Lemon Court concluded that a law's "principal or primary
242. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 682-84 (1971). The analogy to Tilton is limited to
the extent that the Court held that the provision in Tilton was unconstitutional effect and did
not hold that there was a sectarian purpose. Id. Nevertheless, the Tilton Court did not limit
the Court's discretion to sever an unconstitutional section from a statute to cases where the
effect of the statute was unconstitutional. Id.
243. Id.
244. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 682-84 (1971) (invalidating the portion of a statute
which allowed colleges and universities to use buildings constructed with federal funds for
sectarian purposes after twenty years).
245. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. at 257-72 (court looked at primary purpose of statute).
246. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 681 (1984) (Court reviewed whether primary
effect of displaying creche was greater endorsement of religion than other cases where Court
found no endorsement).
247. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. at 2581.
248. Id.; Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 301 (1980). Harris held that Title XIX does not
require states that receive Medicaid reimbursement to pay for medically necessary abortions.
Id. at 316-17. Furthermore, "the fact that the funding restrictions in the Hyde Amendment
may coincide with the religious tenets of the Roman Catholic Church does not, without more,
contravene the Establishment Clause." Id. at 319-20.
249. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 681 (1984). In Lynch, the Court changed the
effects prong of the Lemon test in a manner which may result in upholding laws that are
clearly unconstitutional:
But to conclude that the primary effect of including the creche is to advance religion
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effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion. " 250 which the
Kendrick Court restated as whether a statute's "primary effect is the ad-
vancement of religion. 251
The following example illustrates the significance of the manner in which
the Kendrick Court distorted the Lemon test. If the Court examined the
primary effect of a bill that had the following two provisions: the first
granting one thousand dollars to the Catholic Church and, another, that
balanced the national budget, the Court might find that the amount of
money spent to support Catholicism was minimal. If the Court applied the
analysis it used in Kendrick to this situation, it would hold that the statute
was facially valid because the primary effect, establishing the national budget,
is secular. However, under the more reasonable approach applied in Com-
mittee for Public Education & Religious Freedom v. Nyquist,2 2 the Court
would hold that the statute also has the secondary effect of promoting the
religious beliefs of the Catholic Church, and would therefore, be inconsistent
with the establishment clause.2 11
Preventing teenage pregnancy was held to be a permissible primary effect
under Kendrick, even though this primary effect might have a secondary
effect which advances religion.2 4 The Kendrick Court should have invalidated
the part of AFLA which promoted religion in the same way the Tilton Court
invalidated part of the HEFA.215 The Court in Tilton v. Richardson applied
the effect prong of the Lemon test correctly. 256 The Tilton Court upheld
only the provisions of the challenged statute which had the primary effect
of aiding education. 2"1 Therefore, the Court invalidated the section of the
statute which allowed the sectarian use of the buildings after twenty years
because the statute had the secondary effect of promoting religion. 258
3. Excessive Entanglement
The Kendrick Court's final error was its failure to recognize the excessive
entanglement of government and religion which may result from the oper-
ation of the AFLA. While the AFLA, on its face, does not inherently violate
in violation of the Establishment Clause would require that we view it as more
beneficial to and more an endorsement of religion, for example, than expenditure
of large sums of public money for textbooks supplied throughout the country to
students attending church-sponsored schools ....
Id. The Kendrick Court maintained this change. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. at 2570.
250. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) (citing Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392
U.S. 236, 243 (1968)).
251. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. at 2570.
252. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
253. Id. at 783-85 n.39.
254. Id.; Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. at 2570.
255. 403 U.S. 672, 683 (1971).
256. Id. at 672.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 682-84 (1971).
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any of the three factors which the Court looked at to determine whether a
statute unconstitutionally entangles government with religion, it is impossible
to positively determine whether the AFLA's grantees will be pervasively
sectarian by examining the statute on its face; the AFLA does not explicitly
require that any grantees be pervasively sectarian.259
Although the nature of the aid, teaching and counseling, creates the danger
of governmental endorsement of religion when government provides the
grants to pervasively sectarian organizations, the Secretary of Health and
Human Services could decide not to fund pervasively sectarian organizations,
and thus administer the AFLA in a constitutional manner.2"6 Similarly, if
the grantees are not pervasively sectarian, there would be little risk that the
statute, on its face, would promote excessive entanglement. 26'
Nevertheless, it would be unrealistic to expect the Secretary of Health and
Human Services to apply the AFLA in a constitutional manner. The language
and purpose of the AFLA invites the Secretary to promote religion and
create excessive entanglement. 262 The Court should invalidate a statute if
grantees are likely to use a substantial percentage of its funds in a manner
which would violate the establishment clause. 263 The majority in Kendrick
ignored the emotional impact of the issues of premarital sex and abortion
when it presumed that religiously affiliated grantees will not invoke relig-
ion. 264 Just as the Lemon Court concluded that it was unrealistic to expect
parochial school teachers to separate their religious beliefs from secular
lessons, 26 it is also unrealistic to expect members of religiously affiliated
organizations to counsel teenagers about procreative issues in purely secular
ways. 26 The AFLA grantees are likely to use a substantial percentage of the
AFLA funds in a manner that promotes religion if the AFLA is administered
in a manner consistent with its purpose.
259. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. at 2573.
260. Id. at 2573-77. The Secretary claimed that he stopped funding those grantees which
used the AFLA funds in a sectarian manner. In Walz, New York City exempted all the property
of religious organizations used solely for religious worship from property tax, so unlike Kendrick,
the governmental officials had little, if any, discretion to decide which groups deserved a benefit.
Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
261. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. at 2577-79. Although the Court concluded the AFLA could
hypothetically be applied in a constitutional manner, this is not "as applied" analysis. The
Court looked to whether the AFLA has constitutional effects, on its face, when it examined
whether the Secretary of Health and Human Services could apply the AFLA in a constitutional
manner. "As applied" analysis concerns whether the Secretary has actually applied the statute
in a manner that does not promote religion. Id. at 2578-81.
262. See S. REp. No. 161, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1981).
263. As in Lemon, the government cannot be certain that religious organizations will use
AFLA funds in a secular manner. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text. As in Aguilar,
the statute is likely to have an effect of promoting religion when the grantees are pervasively
sectarian. See supra note 46.
264. Bowen v. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. 2562, 2586 (1988) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
265. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 402 U.S. 602, 618 (1971).
266. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. at 2586 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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To prevent AFLA funded organizations from using the funds for uncon-
stitutional purposes the government would need to establish a substantial
bureaucracy in order to prevent pervasively sectarian organizations from
participating in the AFLA. Governmental monitoring of religious groups
would create resentment along religious lines and would create excessive
entanglement between church and state. The Kendrick Court presumed that
AFLA grantees, like colleges and universities, were not pervasively sectar-
ian.267 Thus, the Court overlooked the likelihood that the AFLA will require
a choice between enduring pervasively sectarian grantees and excessive en-
tanglement between church and state. 211
4. Criticism of the Lemon Test
If the Court properly applies the effects prong of the Lemon test, the
purpose prong serves little function. 269 By eliminating the purpose prong, the
Court could significantly simplify application of the establishment clause to
funding programs. The Court has failed to adequately explain why it was
so concerned about invalidating a statute with sectarian purposes, which
under the Lemon test, is invalid even if the statute's likely effects are
secular. 270 The statutory purpose is only relevant to the extent that it indicates
its likely effects.
The Court could further simplify the Lemon test if it recognized the
interdependence of the entanglement prong and the effects prong.271 When-
ever the Court has found that a statute is likely to cause excessive entangle-
ment, it has implied that entanglement between government and religion
would be necessary to prevent unconstitutional effects. 2 2 As Justice O'Con-
nor has stated, excessive entanglement is a constitutionally impermissible
effect of a statute, so it does not need to be an independent prong. 273 Thus,
the second and third prongs of the Lemon test are interdependent and
inseparable when deciding the constitutionality of a funding program.
In other words, a statute that causes or which poses a substantial risk of
causing effects violative of the establishment clause is invalid because it
would require excessive entanglement between church and state to eliminate
the unconstitutional effect.2 74 The Court could achieve its goals of preventing
267. Id. at 2575.
268. Id.
269. McConnell, supra note 4, at 49. "The motivations of legislators may be evidence of
how the accommodation will function in practice. But the ultimate inquiry should be directed
not at legislative motivation-which may or may not predict results-but on effects." Id.
270. Id. at 48.
271. Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 430 (1985) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("Pervasive
institutional involvement of church and statute may remain relevant in deciding the effect of a
state which is alleged to violate the Establishment Clause.") (emphasis in original).
272. See, e.g., Lemon, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
273. Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 430 (1985) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
274. Id.
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funding programs respecting an establishment of religion with one test: a
funding program violates the establishment clause if it creates substantial
potential for a choice between promoting religion, and extensive monitoring
to prevent such a promotion. 2 7
The AFLA requires a choice between advancing religion and excessive
entanglement between government and religion. 276 It is unlikely that the
Secretary of Health and Human Services will apply the AFLA in a secular
manner because a secular application of the statute would be inconsistent
with the language and the legislative intent of the AFLA.2 77 Furthermore,
religiously affiliated AFLA counselors will be unlikely to separate their
religious views from their secular ones.2s As in Lemon, the AFLA funds
teaching, which is difficult to monitor, and thus creates the constitutionally
impermissible effect of excessive entanglement between church and state. 27 9
In fact, counseling teenagers about procreative matters would pose a
greater risk of religious indoctrination than teaching less personal academic
subjects. 2 0 Furthermore, the Secretary of Health and Human Services is not
likely to have the administrative ability to monitor the counseling at all
AFLA functions that religiously affiliated grantees coordinate.2 8  Even if the
government attempts to monitor all the functions of religiously affiliated
grantees, the grantees are likely to resent the monitoring. If grantees resent
such governmental monitoring, political divisions along religious lines will
develop, and religious intolerance will increase. 28 2 Thus, the Court should
have banned funding of religiously affiliated AFLA grantees and applicants.
B. The AFLA as Applied
Although the Kendrick Court stated that there was not enough evidence
in the record to determine whether the AFLA had been applied in a consti-
275. Id.
276. See Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. 2562, 2583-85 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (1988).
277. See supra notes 105-08 and accompanying text.
278. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. at 2588 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
279. The Lemon Court concluded that the degree of certainty needed to insure that parochial
schools do not promote religion could only be achieved by totally banning direct funding of
the parochial schools or requiring monitoring that would result in excessive entanglement between
church and state. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971); Lee, The Religion Clauses:
Problems and Prospects, 1986 B.Y.U. L. Rav. 341-42 (Lee concluded that the entanglement
prong burdens religions which are willing to endure governmental restrictions of funds, and
thus, the entanglement prong itself is an impermissible entanglement between government and
religion); contra Choper, The Religion Clauses of the Amendment: Reconciling the Conflict,
41 U. PrrT. L. REv. 673 (1980) ("1 believe that avoidance of church-state entanglement, at the
expense of forsaking legitimate secular pursuits or the more general pursuit of preserving
religious liberty, is mandated neither by the Establishment Clause nor good sense.").
280. See Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. at 2586 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
281. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 622 (for application of problems stemming from monitoring
religious grantees).
282. See id.
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tutional manner, the record reveals substantial evidence that AFLA grantees
actually proselytized and required their employees to teach religion.283 Fur-
thermore, the record reveals that the Secretary of Health and Human Services
discriminated against grantees which did not have a religious affiliations and
continued funding those grantees which proselytized.21 4
The Court's ruling on whether the district court may, on remand, find
that the AFLA was unconstitutional as applied was rather ambiguous. 28 1 The
Court stated that the Secretary informs grantees that they may not use funds
in a sectarian manner, and thus the Secretary forbids grantees from teaching
or promoting religion.2a6 Nevertheless, the Court held that the district court
may determine a remedy to insure that the Secretary complies with the
establishment clause if the district court finds that the Secretary allows
particular grants which have the main effect of promoting religion.2 7 Thus,
in a contradictory manner, the Court stated both that the Secretary does
not allow unconstitutional effects, but the district court may restrict the
Secretary's administration of AFLA if the Secretary does allow unconstitu-
tional effects. 28
In order to determine whether the Secretary applied the AFLA in a
sectarian manner, it is helpful for one to compare the AFLA grantees to
pervasively sectarian institutions, such as parochial schools, and to primarily
secular institutions, such as colleges and universities. Using such a compar-
ison, the Kendrick Court should have considered many of the AFLA reci-
pients be pervasively sectarian. For example, in Lemon v. Kurtzman, where
the statutes funded religious elementary and secondary schools, the instruc-
tors' handbooks required teachers not to deviate from religious principles. 28 9
Similarly, some of the AFLA grantees require in their articles of incorpo-
ration that employees may not deviate from religious doctrine. 290 Addition-
ally, students at parochial schools, like the AFLA program participants,
were young and impressionable. 29'
In contrast, in Tilton v. Richardson,292 in which the Court upheld the
constitutionality of a statute which provided construction grants for colleges
283. Kendrick v. Bowen, 657 F. Supp. at 1565 (D.D.C. 1987).
284. See generally Brief for Appellees and Cross-Appellants, Bowen v. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct.
2562 (1988) (No. 87-253).
285. See Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. at 2581.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 618.
290. Kendrick v. Bowen, 657 F. Supp. 1547, 1565 (D.D.C. 1987). Although all religiously
affiliated groups would not necessarily have such strict rules, the Secretary of Health and
Human Services has done little to prevent pervasively religious groups from participating in the
AFLA. See Appellees' and Cross-Appellees' Brief at 8-9, Bowen v. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. 2562
(1988) (No. 87-253).
291. Bowen v. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. 2588 (1988).
292. 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
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and universities, no religious principles or restrictions were imposed upon
employees. 293 Thus, the facts of Kendrick resemble the facts of Lemon more
than the facts of Tilton.
The majority concluded that evidence on the record indicated that some
of the grantees had used funds in an unconstitutional manner. 294 The Court,
however, was unreasonable in concluding that the record did not clearly
indicate whether the Secretary of Health applied AFLA in an unconstitutional
manner. 29 There was no legitimate reason to remand the case. 296 There were
no substantial disputes about the facts. 297
The Court did not sufficiently consider the conclusiveness of the evidence
on the record that grantees had used AFLA funds to promote religion.291
Even if most AFLA grantees acted in a secular manner, the Court should
have found that this is irrelevant to the statute's constitutionality. 299 The
constitutionality of funding the secular grantees should be considered irrel-
evant to the issue of the constitutionality of funding the religiously affiliated
groups.10 Furthermore, the Court in Kendrick never addressed Justice Black-
mun's concern that grantees did not have to report the manner in which
their subgrantees spend funds; many of the subgrantees might have used
funds in a sectarian manner in order to meet AFLA's alleged requirement
of involving community religious groups. 0 1 Thus, the Court should have
held that the AFLA has been applied in an unconstitutional manner.
Whether the percentage of religiously affiliated grantees that have used
AFLA grants in a sectarian manner is forty percent, as the majority in
Kendrick contended, 0 2 or sixty percent, as the dissent contended,303 the
percentage was substantial.3°4 When it is likely that a statute will fund grantees
293. Id. at 686-87.
294. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. at 2580.
295. Id. at 2585 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
296. Id. at 2596-97 (Blackmun, J. dissenting).
297. Cross-Appellant's Reply Brief at 5, Bowen v. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. 2562 (1988) (No.
87-253). "Even at this late date, the appellants do not 'dispute' any of the facts that were
uncontroverted and presented to the district court."Id.
298. See Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. at 2585 n.3. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
299. Id. at 2585 n.3 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
300. Id. Cf. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 397 (1983) ("The provision of benefits to so
broad a spectrum of groups is an important index of secular effect.") (quoting Widmar v.
Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 274 (1981)).
301. Justice Blackmun expressed his concern as follows:
[B]ecause of the Government's failure to require grantees to report on subgrant
and subcontract arrangements, . . . we can only speculate as to what additional
public funds subsidized the religious missions of groups that the secular grantees
brought in to fulfill their statutory obligation to involve religious organizations in
the provision of services.
Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. at 2585 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 300z-5(a)(21)(B)
(1988)).
302. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. at 2575 n.12.
303. Id. at 2585 n.3 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
304. Id. at 2575, 2585 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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in a manner which permits a significant portion of the grants to aid perva-
sively sectarian groups, the Court has held that the provisions of the statute
that aid religiously affiliated groups unconstitutional. 5 Thus, the Court
should have held that the AFLA had been applied in an unconstitutional
manner.3 06
Although the Secretary contended that he had applied the AFLA in a
constitutional manner, he conceded that three grantees used AFLA funds in
a sectarian and unconstitutional manner.3 7 The Secretary contended that
two grantees were warned to stop using funds in a sectarian manner30 s
Nevertheless, there is little, if any, evidence to support the Secretary's
argument that grantees that violated the establishment clause no longer
received benefits under AFLA.3°9 Although the Secretary stopped giving
funds to one of the grantees that the district court cited for constitutional
violations, the record indicates that the reason the Secretary denied funding
to the grantee, Catholic Charities of Arlington, was that it did not reach
out into the community sufficiently. 10 Even if the Secretary correctly argued
that the Catholic Charities program lost its funding because of sectarian
teaching, the Secretary's way of reprimanding Arlington was not consistent
with Tilton v. Richardson."' Instead of requiring grantees to return funds
used in an unconstitutional manner, as the federal government required in
Tilton,31 2 the Secretary actually gave Catholic Charities additional funds to
wrap up its program.3"3 The Secretary failed to make a substantial effort to
enforce the establishment clause.31 4
The Secretary's other administrative actions also did not support his
contention that he had actively prevented proselytism with governmental
funds." 5 Although the Secretary of Health and Human Services sent a notice
to grantees which stated that grantees may not proselytize, there is little
basis to conclude that the notice significantly changed the enforcement of
AFLA.1 6 The notice might have been a mere attempt to defend the AFLA
against legal challenges, without any attempt to enforce the notice because
the Secretary did not send out the notice until Kendrick challenged the
constitutionality of the AFLA.3 1 7 Thus, there is little basis to conclude that
305. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 682-84 (1971).
306. See supra notes 46, 67.
307. Brief for the Appellant at 41, Bowen v. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. 2562 (1988) (No. 87-253).
308. Brief at 742-43.
309. Id. at 517-19, 675-76, 742-43.
310. Id. at 742-43.
311. 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
312. Id. at 682-84.
313. Id. at 742-43 (joint appendix).
314. Id.
315. Contra Brief for the Appellant at 41, Bowen v. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. 2562 (1988) (No.
87-253) ("Finally, where there were departures from proper constitutional practice, they were
met by firm action by the Secretary.").
316. See Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. at 2594 (Blackmun, J. dissenting).
317. Id.
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the Secretary applied the AFLA in a manner consistent with the establishment
clause.18
Even if the AFLA did not advance sectarian views, the Court should have
held that the AFLA was unconstitutional as applied because the Secretary
denied grants to potential grantees which did not include the participation
of religious organizations.3 9 Under the Office of Adolescent Pregnancy
Programs ("OAPP"), the AFLA reviewed its reasons for determining why
the Secretary denied grants to some potential grantees.3 20 Although the district
court did not make any findings on whether the Secretary used religion as
a criteria for aid, sectarian grant applicants who were inexperienced in
preventing teenage pregnancy were sometimes accepted instead of experienced
secular grantees. 21 Some potential grantees were even notified that the reason
that they were denied grants was their failure to include religion in their
programs 322
Although the Court has upheld laws which incidentally promote religion,
the sectarian effects of the AFLA are substantial and are distinguishable
from the sectarian effects that the Court has considered incidental in Lynch
v. Donnelly.3 23 The AFLA was adopted in 1981, so it does not qualify under
the "traditional" test applied in Marsh v. Chambers and Lynch.3 ' Unlike
the creche in Lynch, which cost about $20 a year to put together and
dismantle, funding religiously affiliated AFLA groups has cost taxpayers $16
million since 1982.325
C. Justice Kennedy's Concurring Opinion
In his concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy indicated that he would weaken
the Lemon analysis substantially. Justice Kennedy's opinion conflicts with
Lemon, where the Court ruled that the government may not fund grantees
that are pervasively sectarian for activities in which there is some danger of
religious indoctrination. 326 Justice Kennedy would condition the enforcement
of the establishment clause upon the Secretary's: (1) ability to detect viola-
318. Id.
319. Appellees' and Cross-Appellees' Brief at 8-9, Bowen v. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. 2562 (1988)
(No. 87-253). Rejected applicants were told that they had not received funding because their
programs promised "no involvement of religious groups," Id. at 8 n.16. See Notices, 8682,
8684, (Mar. 1, 1982). "All Demonstration Projects The following requirements ... prevention
services .... Applicants shall include innovative approaches as appropriate for encouraging
and supporting the involvement of families, religious and charitable organizations and voluntary
associations in the provision of services." Id.
320. Brief at 8 n.15.
321. Id. at 8-9.
322. Id. at 8 n.16.
323. 465 U.S. 668 (1978).
324. See Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. at 2566.
325. Id. at 2585 n.3 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
326. Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 762 (1976); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403
U.S. 602 (1971).
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tions; (2) willingness to enforce the Constitution; (3) interpretation of the
Constitution; and (4) administrative power to prevent grantees from using
funds in a sectarian manner.3 27 Justice Kennedy failed to recognize that under
the Lemon test, the Court does not even need to look at how the funds are
being used if the institutions are pervasively sectarian and resulting in a
substantial risk of sectarian use of the funds. 312 The Secretary should not be
able to circumvent Lemon by applying an allegedly secular statute in a
sectarian manner.3 29 If the majority adopted Justice Kennedy's approach,
the Secretary could fund parochial schools with AFLA funds and maintain
the funding until the grantees were caught using funds in a sectarian man-
ner.330 It would be expensive, if not impossible, for the Secretary to monitor
such funding.33" ' Even if a parochial school that was an AFLA grantee was
caught teaching sectarian ideas about teenage pregnancy, it could claim that
the particular dollars spent on such teaching were not the AFLA funds.3
2
Instead of only looking to the manner in which AFLA funds are used,
the Court should consider both the religious character of the institutions
and the evidence of how grantees have used the funds.33 Pervasively sectarian
groups should not be able to receive funds, and those grantees which are
not sectarian should be eligible for funds under the establishment clause
unless there is evidence of sectarian use.3
3 4
IV. IMPACT
Barring an extreme situation, the Court seems to be unwilling to invalidate
a statute on its face that includes religiously affiliated organizations among
its grantees, unless the grantees are parochial schools. 35 Thus, even if there
is substantial risk that grantees will use funds in an unconstitutional manner,
the Court is not likely to invalidate a challenged statute, on its face.336 The
Court is likely to uphold a statute unless almost all of the grantees are
inherently and pervasively sectarian, as in the parochial school cases.3 37
The Kendrick Court sought to significantly reduce the range of govern-
mental actions which constitute an establishment of religion. 33 The Court is
likely to uphold the constitutionality of some projects which create a sub-
stantial risk of pervasively sectarian use of governmental funds. 339 Further-
327. Lemon, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
328. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. at 2580 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
329. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 602.
330. See Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. at 2582 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
331. 42 U.S.C. § 300z-8.
332. Id.
333. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 602; Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
334. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 602; Tilton, 403 U.S. at 672.
335. See Bowen v. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. 2562 (1988).
336. Id. at 2582-85 (Blackmun, J. dissenting).
337. See, e.g., Lemon, 403 U.S. at 602.
338. See Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. at 2573-74, 2580-81.
339. Id.
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more, the majority in Kendrick implied that it can still preserve the
establishment clause even if the Court constricts the definition of pervasively
sectarian.
The Court will probably allow religion to be among the criteria for funding
programs in a rather restrictive sense. 340 The Kendrick Court seems to permit
religion as among the criteria for funding grantees, but does not permit
religion to be an exclusive factor. For example, the AFLA requires grantees
to promote community involvement. Thus, if groups A and B seek funding,
A promotes no community involvement and B promotes only religious
community involvement, it is likely that the Court would permit the Secretary
to favor B over A. The Court would reason that B received funding because
it promoted community involvement, and not because it promoted religion.
Thus, B could have promoted community involvement among other groups
than religious groups, and therefore, is not being discriminated against
because it did not promote religion.34'
Because of the Court's unwillingness to find that the AFLA has been
applied in an unconstitutional manner, it risks creating political divisions
along religious lines, which would run contrary to the policies behind the
formation of the establishment clause.142 Political conflict on religious grounds
would spread from issues such as abortion and funding of parochial schools
to the subject of how to prevent teenage pregnancy.3 43 Even if religions other
than Christianity3" were represented under the AFLA, the AFLA could still
divide people along religious lines. 345 The AFLA forbids funding of groups
that advocate abortion. 3" If AFLA grantees advocate their views about
premarital sex, birth control and abortion in a sectarian manner, religious
groups with opposing views might resent governmental funds supporting
these views.347 Moreover, the controversy behind whether religious groups
may hire members of their own faith with governmental funds is likely to
escalate.3 48 Thus, the Kendrick Court should have held that the AFLA risks
340. See id. at 2573-74, 2580-81.
341. Id.
342. See supra note 12; contra Choper, supra note 279, at 683. "[A]voidance of political
strife along religious lines neither should, nor can, represent a value to be judicially secured by
the Establishment Clause." Id.
343. Brief of the Anti-Defamation League of B'Nai B'rith on Behalf of Itself and Americans
for Religious Liberty ,as Amici Curiae, in Support of Appellees at 7, Bowen v. Kendrick, 108
S. Ct. 2562 (1988) (No. 87-253).
344. No Jewish groups received funding under the AFLA. Id. ("The Record Shows Partic-
ipating Religious Organizations Are Exclusively Christian and the Programs Involve Promul-
gation of Christian Doctrine.").
345. See Kendrick v. Bowen, 657 F. Supp. 1547, 1562 (D.D.C. 1987).
346. 42 U.S.C. § 300z-10(a) (1988).
347. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622-24 (1971).
348. See Chopko, Don't Exclude the Churches, NAn. L.J., Feb. 29, 1988, at 14, col 1.
Objecting to proposed congressional restrictions upon religious discrimination in governmentally
funded programs, Chopko stated: "How is religious liberty strengthened by demanding an end
of member (hiring] preferences?" "How is the public benefitted if religious groups are forced
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intensifying political division along religious lines.34 9
The impact of Lemon will grow weaker as the Supreme Court permits
effects which indirectly promote religion.350 As the Supreme Court applies
its cramped interpretation of the second prong of the Lemon test, Congress
is likely to test the Supreme Court with statutes which have secondary effects
of promoting religion as a criterion."' Congress will probably form programs
similar to AFLA in other areas. For example, Congress might fund religious
organizations to participate in drug testing. Even more likely, Congress
might fund religious organizations to expand child care programs and for
the homeless.352 Ironically, those who support social welfare may join with
others in support of religious organizations to increase funding of religiously
affiliated organizations."'
Finally, it is difficult to predict how Kendrick will effect teenage pregnancy
rates. If the Court had ruled that the AFLA is completely unconstitutional,
Congress might have enacted a bill funding only secular groups. If the Court
had forbidden religious groups from participating, perhaps there would be
a sufficient number of worthy secular grantees for the Secretary to efficiently
allocate its entire budget. Furthermore, it is difficult to determine whether
AFLA reduces pregnancy rates at all, let alone whether religion contributes
to reducing teenage pregnancy rates. 5 4 The only study on the effects of
AFLA on adolescent pregnancy rates published at the time of this Note
indicated that the AFLA program did reduce pregnancy rates.35 5 The authors
stated that religious groups did participate in the program, but the authors
were unable to determine what factors contributed to the reduction of
pregnancy rates.356
to avoid providing child care under these circumstances?" Id. Mark E. Chopko is general
counsel of the National Conference of Catholic Bishops and the United States Catholic
Conference in Washington D.C. See also Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 107 S. Ct. 2862 (1987). Under Title VII, religious groups
may discriminate against members of other faiths in nonprofit activities in order to "carry out
their religious missions." Id. at 2870. Nevertheless, this free exercise rationale may not apply
to governmental programs, in which religious groups may choose not to participate. If govern-
mentally funded religiously affiliated groups have the privilege of discriminating on the basis
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V. CONCLUSION
In Bowen v. Kendrick the Court held that funding religiously affiliated
groups, among other groups, for the purpose of preventing teenage pregnancy
was not facially unconstitutional. The Court remanded the case to the district
court to determine if the Secretary had applied the AFLA in a constitutional
manner. The Court should have held that the AFLA is unconstitutional on
its face. Under traditional Lemon test analysis, one of the AFLA's purposes
is secular, so the purpose is constitutional. However, the AFLA also has the
purpose of promoting religion. The Congress intended religious groups which
participate in the AFLA to promote morality, instead of allowing religiously
affiliated groups to participate for secular reasons, such as the tendency of
religiously affiliated groups to be active in charitable pursuits.
Thus, the effects of AFLA are likely to cause excessive entanglement.
Although the AFLA could hypothetically be administered in a manner that
does not promote religion, such results are unlikely because of the AFLA's
sectarian purpose and the plain meaning of the statute. Furthermore, the
AFLA is likely to promote excessive entanglement between church and state
if the government tries to counteract the promotion of religion by monitoring
the religious groups. Excessive entanglement will cause the religiously affil-
iated groups to resent governmental monitoring, will increase political divi-
sions along religious lines, and will increase religious intolerance.
Even if the Court correctly upheld the AFLA on its face, it should have
held that the AFLA has been applied in an unconstitutional manner. A
significant portion of the AFLA grantees have carried out their programs in
a sectarian manner, and the Secretary has done little to prevent sectarian
grantees from continuing to indoctrinate with governmental funds. In the
early years of the AFLA, the Secretary denied funds to groups which were
purely secular. Although the majority in Kendrick claimed that the evidence
of establishment clause violations was inconclusive, the evidence was sub-
stantial.
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